

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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President : The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

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THE
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XIII. No. 4.

OCTOBER, 1921.

MOUNTAIN, FOREST AND RIVER.

Indeed one might work out a strong argument for the value of these districts of survival, on the ground that ancient survivals are often the real beginnings of fresh initiative.—*Fleure*.

ART, as in all matters of life, is a case of looking backward in order to look forward. The new ventures, the fresh ideas have, more frequently than we are apt to imagine, their inspiration in, not perhaps so much the works of some past ancient civilization, as in the conditions which created that civilization, conditions of place, work and folk, which in their original sense still obtain, and still influence and determine the avenue of new adventure. The following is an attempt to indicate how these resulted in the diverse architecture of the various countries of its origin.

Much that I have to say, has been said before. Geographical and social conditions, and their resultant effects on architecture, have been in some measure considered by most architectural writers; but, perhaps, what has not been so fully appreciated, is the fact that the earlier and more primitive conditions of life have for all times influenced all subsequent art, and will continue to exert such influence, throughout the ages.

It is more particularly with the comparisons afforded between the early civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the classic life of ancient Greece and Rome and the mediæval life of Northern Europe, with which I am now attempting to deal.

Greece and Italy are both mountainous lands with sunny slopes towards the temperate sea. They have from their position and the character of their soil afforded from early times settlements for man, giving him in exchange for moderate effort a sufficiency of material things, with leisure for the cultivation of the higher interests of life. These are the classic lands of olive, vine and corn. The history of early Mediterranean civilization, the story of the great human sea, has been such a constant theme of historians and writers, and is so well known that it is only proposed to touch on some of its outstanding features in this short sketch.

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In contradistinction, the great European plain which stretches from the British Isles and the Paris basin to the forests of Russia, including as it does the great Powers of modern Europe, may be described as the land of "Mediæval" or so-called "Gothic" culture. Throughout this plain, the dominant primeval covering was the damp temperate forest, and it is the conquest of this forest and its influence on the habits and imaginations of its conquerors, that has so profoundly influenced the history and arts of modern Europe.

It is with the contrast of these two zones, of the classic lands of the Mediterranean on the one hand with the great European plain on the other, and of the resultant buildings that their different civilizations produced, that we are now concerned.

In ancient Greece, the home of classic architecture, we have an abundance of limestone in the hills and mountains surrounding the Athenian plain, with the beautiful marble of Pentelicus near at hand, and that of Paros and Naxos, available a short distance across the sea. Now it was the abundance and availability of this limestone and marble that mainly determined the character and development of classic architecture. We might even go so far as to call it the architecture of the quarryman, in distinction and opposition to the architecture of the great European plain, which might be described as that of the woodman.

The use of large stones has been an important factor in classic building from the earliest examples. From the time when those mysterious Pelasgians built their gigantic walls round the Acropolis and elsewhere a love of large simple stones seems to have been an ineradicable characteristic of Greek and Roman builders.

In that ambitious project of Pisistratus, the temple of Zeus Olympius, which remained unfinished to the time of Hadrian: one of the drums of the columns of Piraeic limestone (the largest extant Greek column known) is 7 ft. 10 in. across. Those of the Parthenon of Pentelic marble are 6 ft. 3 in. across at the bottom.

It is then quite obvious, after a very little reflection, that it was only the nearness of the quarries that made the use of such large stones practical. If they had had to be brought from great distances, the expense and difficulty of transport in those early days would have made the employment of them, for all except the most important of their buildings, an impossibility. Whereas we find them in pretty general use as far as the earlier buildings of the Motherland and the Western Colonies of Greece are concerned.

In the eastern colonies of Ionia a lighter form of column was used, though here too there is evidence of a liking for the large stone, as witness the columns of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, the capital of which may be seen at the British Museum.

The history of Greek temple architecture is the slow evolution of two distinct types—the Doric and the Ionic—without any real change in variety, rather a gradual perfection of early prototypes, resulting in the crowning glories of the Parthenon and the Erechtheum on the Acropolis at Athens in the 5th century B.C.

It is not proposed here to go into the much discussed question of the origin of these two types or to state whether they sprang from certain rock-cut tombs or from some earlier timber post construction.

The glory of Greek architecture is not concerned with its origin, but with what it became in the fulness of its harmonious completion. These Greek temple shapes are essentially the work of a mountain people, expressing as they do in every part repose, security and balance, wrought with loving care out of the hill or mountain on which they stand.

Contrast the long low lines of the Parthenon, having the stability of a hill top building with the aspiring wonder of Nôtre Dame or Amiens—the buildings of the plain. Not that we do not find the Gothic cathedrals on hills—as at Lincoln or Chartres, and classic temples on the plain—as the Theseum at Athens; but these examples do not invalidate the general argument, which is that the classic temple is peculiarly the work of a mountainous people, long used to the knowledge and limitations of stone, whilst the Gothic temples are the creation of the plainsman desirous of attaining height and elevation and working under the influence of that primeval forest which had exercised such influence on the early history of his race.

As I have already stated, the large stone and the square form of the structure is a characteristic of all classic buildings from Greek and Roman to Renaissance times; it resulted in a simplicity of outline and a directness of design.

This then was the architecture of the quarryman, the worker in stone, who from intimate knowledge and love of his material, was able to produce the wonder of the Parthenon. We know him under various names—as the rough hewer and excavator at the quarry; as the mason who dresses the more finished stone, and as the sculptor who adorns it and makes it precious with his ideas and fancies. Fundamentally, they are all one and the same, workers in stone; and if either of the higher grades, the mason or the sculptor, forget the origin of their material, forget the simple square outlines of the original block, their work will become debased, and whatever beauty they may achieve it will not be the beauty of the classic.

We know for a fact that many of the stones for the Parthenon were actually worked at the quarries, leaving the finishing touches

only for the masons, who were to put them in position on the building. Consider with what exquisite care the drums of the columns were jointed; so finely that the completed columns, except to the closest scrutiny, gave an appearance of being formed of one single stone. And the ill-success of recent unfortunate attempts to restore some of the fallen columns is entirely due to the fact that owing to the edges of the flutings round the drums having been broken in their fall it has been impossible to give the re-erected columns that appearance of a single stone on which the success of the building as a whole so greatly depended. The result is singularly lifeless, as of a corpse galvanized into dreadful activity by means of some hidden agent, but lacking all the convincing vitality of the living flesh.

It must not be thought for a moment that the beauty of Greek buildings depended solely on fine masonry and large stones; indeed, in some of the more beautiful of the smaller temples the stones are comparatively small.

It was the whole life of these favoured mountainous and maritime people, with their ideals and aspirations, their religion and politics, that made these buildings possible. Their love of an outdoor life and their almost worshipful admiration of the human figure, resulted in that marvellous sculpture which has been the delight and despair of all succeeding ages. But it was the mountain that was, above all, the real determining factor of their architecture. It was the friendly barrier against the barbarian invader, the citadel of refuge, the kindly provider of the choicest materials for the habitations of people and gods. The dwellers in the Northern plains have rather a horror of the mountain—to them it stands for something alien and terrible. Life for them has always been a more serious business, the result of prolonged and sustained fight with the forces of nature. First the forest, which had to be cleared and conquered, and then the climate and soil. To them the mountains stood for the sterile and unyielding ground which could give them no return for their labour, the heights from which descended the hillmen and the invader. But the fear of the mountain was remote and not like that of the forest, immediate and insistent. The one was an unknown and threatening stranger, the other a known and dreaded tyrant, demanding constant warfare and a never-ceasing vigilance.

Professor Fleure in his illuminating work, "Human Geography in Western Europe," describes the influence of the forest in these words :—

Man, occupying this zone, began in some parts as a shepherd on the heights, in others as a lake-dweller, but it needed immense effort before he could convert the forest into farm and corn land.

There can be little doubt that the local folk lore, collected by the Grimms, for instance, is related to the clearing of the forest, the clash of grass landers and hillmen and forest hunters, the finding of nests of wild aboriginal folks in the forest depths.

War against the forest enforced co-operation, and the agricultural village community is, or has once been, characteristic of practically the whole forest zone, from the days when man moved valleywards, down to the time when the forest ceased to play a great part in every day life, because communications and the policing of the ways had developed.

As the mountain life in Greece together with the clear beautiful climate developed in the Greeks a love of openness and simplicity, and a hatred of mystery and uncertainty; so the northern forests left a legacy of fear and mystery, growing less as the forest receded, but colouring for all time the habits and thoughts of the peoples of Northern Europe.

But if the forest exacted hard work and sustained effort it also brought many good gifts to its inhabitants. The gifts of fuel and an abundance of timber for houses and ships.

It will be easily understood how the clearing of the forest developed a race of woodlanders and a knowledge and use of timber construction. Even to this day fine examples of timber and half-timber houses dating from the Middle Ages are common to England, France and Germany, as well as Norway, Sweden and Russia, houses characteristic of the forest zone, and not found in the stone and marble districts of the southern countries.

The position of France, with its window on the Mediterranean, made it the shortest and clearest route across the Continent from the south, along which flowed the more ancient civilizations northwards. France was particularly susceptible to all influences coming from the classic lands, so that we afterwards find her under the influence of the Benedictine builders, building that unrivalled series of cathedrals in the Paris basin; and at a still later time and whilst Italy was groaning under the Spanish domination, taking up the traditions of the Renaissance.

Owing to the geographical situation, France became at an early date the first cleared part of the temperate forest: "the place where all types mixed, the place where the wild men of the north learnt to revere the great memory of Rome."

After the withdrawal of the Romans and at the time when the French were developing what is called the Romanesque style, they had at first no other thought than to imitate the square barrel vaulting of their imperial teachers.

Every effort was made to vault the churches in a way as nearly as possible like those chambers of ancient Rome baths and other

buildings which in the ninth and again in the eleventh century were somewhat familiar to the inhabitants. As, however, the Roman system of building with the solid block of mortar masonry, could hardly be achieved by these poor and half-organized communities they undertook the bold task of doing what the Romans had never done, and building groined vaults with separate visible stones. These were not indeed what we should call squared rubble or dressed rubble, no piece being larger than a man could carry on his shoulder or otherwise up a ladder, and then put into place without the aid of machinery.

We here see the instinctive turning of the woodlander to ideas of timber construction ; nothing is easier, nor indeed more common, than the use of wood ribs with panelling. So that immediately he has to attempt a new and difficult problem he falls back on the old traditional method with which he is familiar.

Ruskin, in his "Stones of Venice," describes the transition from wood to stone of the early Gothic churches :—

The Lombard architecture represents, as I said, the whole of that of the northern barbaric nations. And this, I believe, was, at first an imitation in wood of the Christian Roman Churches, or basilicas. Without staying to examine the whole structure of a basilica, the reader will easily understand thus much of it : that it had a nave and two aisles, the nave much higher than the aisles that the nave was separated from the aisles by two rows of shafts, which supported, above, large spaces of flat or dead wall, rising above the aisles, and forming the upper part of the nave, now called the clerestory, which had a gabled wooden roof. These high dead walls were, in Roman work, built of stone ; but in the wooden work of the north, they must necessarily have been made of horizontal boards or timbers attached to uprights on the top of the nave pillars, which were themselves also of wood. Now, these uprights were necessarily thicker than the rest of the timbers, and formed vertical square pilasters above the nave piers. As Christianity extended and civilization increased, these wooden structures were changed into stone ; but they were literally petrified, retaining the form which had been made necessary by their being of wood. The upright pilaster above the nave pier remains in the stone edifice, and is the first form of the great distinctive feature of northern architecture. In that form the Lombards brought it into Italy in the seventh century, and it remains to this day in St. Ambrogio of Milan and St. Michele of Pavia.

When the vaulting shaft was introduced in the clerestory walls additional members were added for its support of the nave piers.

Perhaps two or three pine trunks, used for a single pillar, gave the first idea of the grouped shaft.

We have now all the factors which produced those marvellous cathedrals in France, on the Rhine border and in this country ; the great artistic achievement of the Middle Ages.

First, the great European plain with its traditions of forest lore and wood-craft, open to the passage of the Mediterranean people

through France; secondly, the difficulty of imitating Roman construction with small stones, the use of which was necessitated by the distance of the mountains and quarries from the central portion of the Paris basin where these efforts were first made, and the difficulty of carrying such stones with the transport at that time available; and, thirdly, the application of timber methods of construction to stone. It is not without reason that writers on mediæval architecture have dwelt on the analogy of the great cathedral vaults and arcades with the forest avenues and the branching trees.

*The Gothic church plainly originated in a rude adaptation of the forest trees with all their boughs to a festal or solemn arcade, as the bands above the cleft pillars still indicate the green withes that tied them. No one can walk in a road cut through pine woods, without being struck with the architectural appearance of the grove, especially in winter, when the bareness of all other trees show the low arch of the Saxons. In the woods in a winter afternoon one will see as readily the origin of the stained glass window with which the Gothic cathedrals are adorned, in the colours of the western sky seen through the bare and crossing branches of the forest. Nor can any lover of nature enter the old piles of Oxford and the English cathedrals without feeling that the forest overpowered the mind of the builder, and that his chisel, his saw, and plane still reproduced its ferns, its spikes of flowers, its locust, its pine, its oak, its fir, its spruce.

As mediæval building develops through the Decorated and Flamboyant periods, this analogy becomes more and more striking. Under the guidance of the chief stone workers, who became rather carvers than sculptors, it developed crocket, trefoil and cusp, the lines of forest growth become more and more pronounced, the use of rib panelling or vaulting with the arch and buttress are carried to such daring conclusions that any further advance is impossible; and with the passing away of that religious inspiration which was responsible for those wondrous and beautiful fanes, there passes away also those mighty master builders who, in the midst of their fertile plains, sent their aspiring edifices flaming up to God.

So far, I have dealt only with a comparison between the origins of Classic and Gothic work, but it might be instructive and interesting to turn to the earlier work of Mesopotamia and Egypt, and to enquire whether the same underlying conditions of place, work and folk determined the style and character of the architecture.

The geographical conditions of Mesopotamia and Egypt are very similar; both countries depend for their fertility on the regular inundations of their rivers.

Mesopotamia, which at the present time looms so largely in the political foreground, is a large tract of land lying between the two historic rivers of the Euphrates and the Tigris.

* Emerson's *Essay on History*.

In early times this land was developed by a wonderful system of irrigation, traces of which can still be found throughout the district. The neglect of the waterworks following the invasion of the country by the nomadic and unagricultural Arab led to the reversion of the whole land to desert.

But it is with the earlier civilization that we are now concerned, with the primitive agricultural life, which has ever tended to the concentration of wealth in centres, and here produced the historic city of Babylon.

The whole of the southern portion of Mesopotamia is quite flat, the northern part being bounded by a series of low limestone hills, so that building materials were limited. There was very little timber; the only available stone was the limestone in the north, but there was an abundance of clay, and, as a consequence, the architecture of Mesopotamia was essentially a clay architecture.

It was the country round the deltas of the rivers that was the first to be cultivated, and it was here that the first cities sprang up and the character of Babylonian and Assyrian civilization determined.

It was the mud of the river deltas that formed the first building material, and it was the primitive agriculturist working on this mud that determined the character of the stone architecture of Assyria; for in the same way that the northern nations of Europe translated their timber buildings into the more permanent stone of the Middle Ages, so did the Assyrians translate the clay forms of their neighbours into the stone palaces of Ninevah.

The brick used would, for the most part, appear to have been a sun-dried brick used in great masses and protected with an outer casing of hard burnt bricks. Travellers from Mesopotamia inform me that the burnt bricks exist to-day as hard as iron, whilst the sun-dried bricks have crumbled into shapeless heaps.

Conjectural restorations of Babylonian buildings show us enormously solid structures with tiny apertures—roofs, walls, stairs, or sloping ways, all built of clay—such was the river architecture of Babylon and Mesopotamia.

Clay, as the sculptors will tell us, is a wonderful medium for modelling in, but to make such modelled work permanent it must be burnt in the form of terra-cotta or translated into stone.

The character of a purely clay decoration would, particularly in primitive buildings, be of very low relief.

We can form a very good idea of what Babylonian ornament must have been from that wonderful series of Assyrian bas-reliefs that we have at the British Museum. If we examine this series

carefully we shall discover the essentially clay character of their prototypes. The very low relief, the carefully rounded surfaces, the conventional treatment of face, hair and drapery, all witness to generations of clay workers, who must have followed on identical lines for centuries, the slowly changing conservatism of a primitive agricultural people. Nothing else would account for the exquisite finish and the extraordinary vigour of these severely conventionalized panels.

It may have been that the earlier Babylonian builders had slabs of this precious limestone brought down by river, and that they treated it as a modern painter would treat a piece of canvas as the background and material for his picture.

Colour must, of course, have entered largely into the scheme of decoration of all Mesopotamia buildings; but what we are chiefly concerned with now is the consideration of how the clay of the deltas became translated into the limestone of the northern hills, and to realize the essential difference that such a translation from such an origin would mean as compared with the quarryman's architecture of Greece and Rome, or the transmuted timber to stone architecture of Northern Europe.

I have said that the geographical conditions of Mesopotamia and Egypt have much in common, but there is one very great and important difference. The architecture of Egypt is also a river architecture, owing its origin to mud and reeds; but it was an architecture transmuted from clay to granite, and it was the near presence of this granite in abundant quantities that made the vital difference. Here, as in Mesopotamia, civilization started in the deltas, and here again clay was the immediate and general material for building. It will be remembered that one of the complaints of the Hebrews before they made the great trek was that they had to make bricks without straw, so that the sun-dried or soft brick was also an essential of early Egyptian building.

The valley of the Nile, nowhere more than some 30 miles wide, is to this day one of the most fertile of places, and in ancient times, under a compact and intensely industrious population, it must indeed have been one of the wealth-producing centres of the world.

This valley, bounded on either side by mountains of granite, forming the outer guards between the fertile corn lands and the desert, was destined to play a great part in the history of the human race. Mr. March Phillips in his book, "Man and his Works," gives a most interesting description of early Egyptian civilization, the life of a hard-working and conservative slave population of agriculturalists, whose sole existence revolved round

the river Nile, and how this great river, with its regular inundations, fertilized their valley, and determined the whole tenor of their lives. It gave them their bread, their laws and their religion.

The Egyptian temples, far more than the Greek, evidence the slow changing, or rather unchanging, habits of their builders. For thousands of years the Egyptian temple was evolved with scarcely any radical changes, each and every building showing unmistakable traces of its clay origin.

The battering walls so characteristic of clay, so wasteful a use of granite, those lintels of enormous depth and columns of tremendous girth, all bear witness to the influence of a cheaper and more easily worked material. With clay one can take no risks, particularly with clay used in the form of sun-dried bricks; there must be a large factor of safety everywhere, there can be no nice calculations as to load and resistance—lintel, column and wall must be generous and ample.

So we have your essential clay worker building in granite, using lintel, column and wall of the same generous amplitude as if he had been building of clay; in granite, the hardest, strongest and most costly to work of all building stones.

Only a nation that for thousands of years had followed the same unchanging round year in and year out, only a nation of slaves and agricultural slaves at that, could have created these gigantic clay monuments of granite.

Without imagination, inspired by the one great central fact of their lives and their civilization, the mighty life-giving river, these early builders have given us a series of monuments which make all the more imaginative of works of later and more adventurous people appear slight and trivial. It was the wonderful juxtaposition of clay and granite, the softest and the hardest of all building materials, which in the hands of the most conservative race the world has known, produced that series of mighty buildings which we know as Egyptian architecture.

Both in Egypt and Mesopotamia the architecture was the architecture of the river and the plain, and in both countries we find evidence of the perpetual desire of the plainsman to achieve height—the dramatic contrast between art and nature.

In Mesopotamia there would appear to have been great towers built with diminishing storeys, each one reached in succession by a continuous road or inclined slope. In Egypt we have the eternal pyramids and the granite obelisk, the latter perhaps the only essentially granite monument evolved by the Egyptians.

This, probably, is the only comparison that can be made between the works of these ancient eastern builders and the cathedrals

and churches of the Middle Ages, in all other respects so utterly dissimilar. The clay mounds of the dweller by the river, the soaring lines of the woodlander, both contrasting with the long, low buildings of the quarryman of the mountains.

STANLEY C. RAMSEY.

LABOUR AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. Edited by John Solano. Macmillan, 1920.

The British Labour Delegation to the Peace Conference made a proposal that instead of centering attention solely on any specific claims of labour which might be inserted in the Peace Treaty, there should be erected an annually recurring International Labour Parliament and an International Labour Office, which should so secure, not one single Labour Charter, but a developing series. This will perhaps in the future be regarded as the most fruitful suggestion embodied in the Peace Treaty. The Conference is not a legislative body in the usual sense; its decrees are not binding as such. The power of the International Parliament consists in its right to secure the submission of its laws to the legislature or other competent authority of the participating states, and its recommendations must be brought within a given time to the attention of Parliament or Congress or whatever law-making body the country may possess (Shotwell, p. 53). Once ratified by the legislature, the recommendations are binding on the country concerned, and the executive is responsible for their enforcement.

The functions of the International Labour Office are of great importance, as it has the duty of investigating the technical problems involved in the proposals of social reform which are to be brought before the Conference; and it also assists in securing the observance of the conventions adopted, and in adapting these to the needs of various countries; and deals with complaints of non-observance. A further important task of the I.L.O. consists in the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment of industrial questions.

This book should be a powerful aid in the education of public opinion on a subject the importance of which is only just beginning to be recognized. Different sections of the subject are treated by different experts, and while all, or nearly all, are good, we think a special interest will be found in the papers by Mr. Oka, Miss Sanger, Mr. Albert Thomas and Mr. Shotwell.

An index is unfortunately missing.

B.L.H.

LABOUR AND INDUSTRY: A series of lectures by Percy Alden, J. M. Baillie, Gerald Bellhouse, J. R. Clynes, G. D. H. Cole, Sir Malcolm Delevigne, Sir D. L. Drummond Fraser, F. W. Goldstone, Percy J. Pybus, R. H. Tawney, Miss E. B. Voysey, J. H. Whitley. Longmans, Green and Co., University Press, Manchester, 1920.

This book is a good summary of contemporary thought on the civics of industry. Amongst the most interesting subjects dealt with are works committees, democratic management of industry, welfare work, education, safety first, and the output and reward of labour.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY TO MODERN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY.

HARRY ELMER BARNES,

Professor of History, Clark University.

(Continued from page 167).

C. James Mark Baldwin (1861-) and the Dialectic of Personal and Social Growth. Baldwin's extensive work in psychology and psychological sociology has gained for him distinction in various fields. Many think of him chiefly as the leading contender of G. Stanley Hall in the field of genetic psychology. Others look upon him as next to Gabriel Tarde, the chief exponent of the psychological and sociological importance of imitation. Finally, he may be correctly viewed as the formulator of a comprehensive and coherent system of psychological sociology.¹

While Baldwin and his disciples have been the only important group in this country to question Hall's primacy in the field of genetic psychology, there was in reality little true competition between these two "schools," so great was the divergence between their modes of approach to the subject. Baldwin deals with the problem from the more purely logical and psychological standpoint, and is inclined to doubt the value of too much reliance upon the law of recapitulation or upon biological and anthropological analogies in interpreting the psychic evolution of the individual. Hence, he was naturally far stronger than Hall in the narrower and more conventionally psychological aspects of his work, but vastly inferior in connecting individual development with the cosmic process and in clarifying the general cultural and sociological lessons and implications of genetic psychology. Perhaps the sharpest contrast between the attitudes of Hall and Baldwin is to be seen in their treatment of the subject of consciousness. Genetic psychology and Freudian psychology both emphasize the significance of the unconscious or sub-conscious, and Hall has been the leading academic exponent of both of these points of view. Baldwin's writings, however, represent almost the apotheosis of consciousness. As he says in one characteristic passage, "the matter of social organization consists of thoughts—by which is meant intellectual states—which are socially available."² Professor M. V. O'Shea, in his review of

1. Baldwin's systematic works which are of interest to us are *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*; and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. His psychology of society is best summarized in *The Individual and Society*. This serves a purpose comparable to Partidge's *Genetic Philosophy of Education*. An exposition of certain of Baldwin's principles is contained in L. M. Bristol's *Social Adaptation*, pp. 193-96; and Baldwin's theory of the social process is criticized by Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*, pp. 30-41.

2. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, third edition, p. 504.

Hall's *Adolescence*, has presented what is, as far as is known to the writer, the best comparison of the methodology and achievements of Hall and Baldwin in this field:—

One naturally compares *Adolescence* as a whole and in particular parts with Baldwin's work; and he finds that there are fundamental points of likeness, but there are many points of difference. Hall's range is far greater, but Baldwin goes much deeper into his specific problem,—the development of mind in the individual, including his intellectual, social and ethical activities and relations. The latter is systematic, logical and psychological throughout, while the former covers in great detail many phases of development, but makes no attempt to be systematic or logical in the strict sense. Both are alike in certain basal characteristics, however. For one thing their work is permeated throughout with modern evolutionary and biological doctrine. Both reject the methods and most of the conclusions of metaphysical and epistemological speculation. Both have the same large aim in view,—to give an account, in the spirit of contemporary biological science, of the natural history of the individual human mind. Both base their story upon the fundamental conception that ontogenesis epitomizes phylogeny; but Baldwin uses the conception only occasionally, while Hall uses it constantly. Baldwin's discussion of mind is concerned very largely with a description of the developmental phenomena of the individual's conscious utilization of experience to secure adjustment; while Hall regards consciousness as of relatively slight importance in the life of the individual. Nine-tenths of mind is submerged; it is neither intellect or emotion; it is impulsion, instinct, the generalization of ancestral experience running away back into the dim geologic past. Consciousness may be only "a wart raised by the sting of sin, a product of alienation or a remedial process. . . . The moving phantasmagoria of images and conscious objects are not the chief facts of mind, as are the many-voiced comments, the sense of assent and dissent, pleasure and pain, the elation of strength or the aesthetic responses, the play of intuitions, the impulses to do or not to do, automatic tensions or contractions. These are not epiphenomenal, but noumenal in soul-life, its primary facts and experiences."

Baldwin's attitude towards his theme is essentially an intellectual and scientific one; he observes, organizes, systematizes, traces causal relations. Hall's attitude is more largely emotional, poetic, ethical, and perhaps hortative. These differences in attitude explain in part differences in temper and tone and style of writing. Baldwin's aim is best realized by means of a comparatively direct, unemotional style, with only a mild use of rhetorical aids; but in all philosophical, biological, psychological, and educational writing, so far as the reviewer's knowledge goes, there is no verbal architect and artist equal to Hall; none who can approach him in the fervour, the stateliness, the impassionateness, the at times well-nigh overwhelming effect of his rhetoric. This style is, though, well suited to his point of view and his purposes. His vision sweeps from one mountain peak to another, and he must tell what he sees in words and phrases that befit the great scenes which he beholds, and that will stir his listeners to action. To influence the conduct of men, not to convince their intellects, is after all, as I see it, the fundamental motive and *raison d'être* of Hall's work. He has more faith anyway in the impulsions of feeling than in the formulas of mechanical reason. He does not believe that the highest type of truth about human nature can come from the psychological laboratory. Modern culture represses feeling and "intellect saps its roots." The psychologist of the study does not concern himself with the deepest and most characteristic things in soul life—with "hate that makes man mad or bestial"; with "love . . . that is stronger than life"; with "fear that shakes the pulses"; with "courage that faces death in its cruellest forms unflinchingly"; and with "torture, and joy that threatens sanity."

Baldwin's major contributions to social and political psychology can probably best be summarized by a brief consideration of his views upon the dialectic of personal growth, the analogous dialectic of social growth, the nature of the social process, and the psychological aspects of social sanctions and social control.

The separate discussion of personal and social growth does not imply any belief on the part of Baldwin that there is a radical distinction between the individual and society. Rather they are parts

of an organic unity, cannot exist alone, and have evolved together :

The traditional contrast between individual and collective interests is largely artificial and mistaken. The individual is a product of his social life, and society is an organization of such individuals. There is, on the whole, no general antagonism of interests. On the contrary, there is a concurrence and practical identity, at least in those great aspects of life which constitute the utilities of society, and motive the essential actions of men.

Society and the individual are not two entities, two forces acting separately, two enemies making forced and grudging concessions each to the other. On the contrary, they are the two sides of a growing organic whole, in which the welfare and advance of the one minister to the welfare and progress of the other.¹

The conception of the dialectic of personal growth is based upon an analysis of the four stages in the development of the individual's consciousness of himself and others. In the first or *objective* stage the infant distinguishes only objects and does not distinguish between personal and impersonal objects. Gradually he is able to discriminate between these and distinguishes persons in their external relations, though he does not become conscious of himself. This second stage is called the *projective*. The child next begins to imitate other persons, and thereby to amplify and extend his own experiences until he becomes conscious of himself and his more vivid experiences. In this third or *subjective* stage the individual also makes the first elementary beginnings of volition. Finally, there comes the fourth or *ejective* stage in which the individual reads his own experience into those of others and becomes conscious of others as similar to himself. In this way the social-self is born, the individual thinking of himself in terms of others and of others in terms of himself.²

Here are, therefore, four very distinct phases of the child's experience of persons not himself, all subsequent to his purely *affective* or pleasure-pain epoch; first, persons are simply *objects*, parts of the material going on to be presented, mainly sensations which stand out strong, etc.; second, persons are very peculiar objects, very interesting, very active, very arbitrary, very portentous of pleasure or pain. If we consider these objects as fully presented, i.e., as in due relationship to one another in space, projected out, and thought of as external, and call such objects again *projects*, then persons at this stage may be called *personal projects*. They have certain peculiarities afterwards found by the child to be the attributes of personality. Third, his own actions issuing from himself, largely by imitation, as we shall see, in response to the requirements of this 'projective' environment, having his own organism as their centre and his own consciousness as their theatre, give him light on himself as *subject*; and, fourth, this light upon himself is reflected upon other persons to illuminate them as also subjects, and they to him then become *ejects* or social fellows.³

The dialectic of social growth constitutes a remarkably analogous process to the dialectic of personal growth. Thoughts are the raw material of the social process, and social growth consists in the appropriation and organization of thoughts. The projective stage of social growth occurs when the thoughts exist only in the minds of the individuals. The subjective period is reached when society appropriates these thoughts and works them over into institutions.

1. *The Individual and Society*, pp. 118, 170.

2. *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, third edition, pp. 17 ff., 318 ff.; *The Individual and Society*, pp. 18-26.

3. *Mental Development*, p. 17.

The ejective level is attained when society compels its component individuals to respect and obey the institutions which embody the thoughts which have been absorbed.¹

If we take any lesson which society learns,—any one thought which it adopts and makes a part of its organized content,—we can trace the passage of this thought or element through the two poles of the 'dialectic of social growth,' just as we can also trace the elements of personal suggestion, in the case of the analogous dialectic of the individual's growth. The new thought is 'projective' to society as long as it exists in the individual's mind only; it becomes 'subjective' to society when society has generalized it and embodied it in some one of the institutions which are a part of her intimate organization; and then finally society makes it 'ejective' by requiring, by all her pedagogical, civil, and other sanctions, that each individual, class, or subordinate group which claims a share in her corporate life, shall recognize it and live up to it.

Society, in other words, makes her particularizations, inventions, interpretations, through the individual man, just as the individual makes his through the alter individual who gives him his suggestions; and then society makes her generalizations by setting the results thus reached to work again for herself in the form of institutions, etc., just as the individual sets out for social confirmation and for conduct the interpretations which he has reached. The growth of society is therefore a growth in a sort of self-consciousness—an awareness of itself—expressed in the general ways of thought, action, etc., embodied in its institutions; and the individual gets his growth in self-consciousness in a way which shows by a sort of recapitulation this twofold movement of society. So the method of growth in the two cases—what has been called the 'dialectic'—is the same.²

The essence of Baldwin's doctrine of the social process may be briefly summarized in the following manner. The raw material of society and socialization is thoughts:—

It is only thoughts or knowledges which are imitable in the fruitful way required by a theory of progressive social organization. . . . It is only in the form of thoughts, conceptions, or inventions that new material, new 'copies for imitation,' new schemes of modified organization, can come into a society at any stage of its development."³

Thoughts arise through invention, but these thoughts are not wholly new. They are rather variations from the old and appear in old channels and from a recombination or reinterpretation of familiar materials:—

The individual becomes the source of the new ideas, the inventions, the formulae of legislation and reform. The individual is the only source of novelties of thought or practice; and it is from the individual that society learns them. They are 'generalized,' discussed, pared down, made available in form and content, by social processes, and then finally passed over to the domain of the accepted and socially selected."⁴

An effective invention is always rooted in the knowledge already possessed by society. No effective invention ever makes an absolute break with the culture, tradition, fund of knowledge treasured up from the past."⁵

The most striking and significant inventions are those of the genius, but even these are socially determined and are not successful unless they are socially accepted. "If perchance the creations of the genius seem in a measure to violate tradition and to be judged more truly by the thinker than by society, nevertheless even such real additions to possible human achievement do not become the social success which makes them additions to human culture, until society

1. *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, third edition, pp. 539 ff.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 540-42.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 504 ff.

4. *The Individual and Society*, pp. 152-3.

5. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 180; Cf. pp. 89-100.

do come up to the standard of judgment which they require."¹ In order to be socially appropriated and, hence, significant, inventions in the field of thought must be spread through imitation. Imitation is of three types representing stages of development. First comes biological, organic or subcortical imitation which embraces all repetitions which are not on a conscious level. Next is found psychological, conscious, or cortical imitation, which implies images or a copy consciously imitated. Finally, there appears plastic or secondarily subcortical imitation, namely, that which was once conscious but has, with the passing of time and increased experience, become automatic and subconscious.² But mere imitation does not complete this social process. The thought imitated must be assimilated by the individual and ejected out into society. "Ideas, inventions of all sorts, are actually propagated by the imitation of one man by another; but this is only one step in their conversion into social matter. Merely this fact of social imitation does not necessarily make these things socially available. If so, my parrot would, by imitating me, come into a social status with reference to me. Another factor is necessary, *i.e.*, imitative assimilation and growth, whereby what is imitated is also organized in the individual's own thought, and imitatively ejected into others, becoming part of a situation—a status scheme—whose organization includes 'publicity' and 'duties and rights.'"³ This social process taken as a whole constitutes the mechanism of social progress :—

There is, therefore, a process of give and take between the individual and society by which what we call the consciousness of the social body as a whole is built up. Society absorbs the thoughts and examples of individuals, and makes them socially available; then the individuals of successive generations receive them by social inheritance and reinforce them in turn. But in this process the individuals again produce variations, exceptional proposals of thought, action, and sentiment, and the social body again reacts to their suggestions. Society takes the "copy" from the individual, as the individual takes it from his fellows; makes it its own, as the individual makes his own the lessons of self-consciousness; and then ejects it back into the individual as the person also has ejected it into his fellows about him. Thus the concurrent growth goes on; the individual feeds upon the current custom, science, morals of his time and group, and society feeds upon the thoughts, inventions, plans of social welfare excogitated by individuals.

This process, taken as a whole, is what we mean by social progress. It is the normal and continuous growth of social organization concurrently with the person's progress in individuality. Its direction is that of the growth of personal self-consciousness; its states are those of ascending self-realization; its ideal is that of the self of the socialized individual. It is progress in the concurrent development of the collectivistic and individualistic factors to which society owes its very existence.⁴

Social progress, which would be inevitably and automatically realized through the reciprocal action of the individual and society, may be hastened through the conscious planning of the human intelligence. "Collectivism, reflective solidarity, the pursuit of

1. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

2. *Mental Development*, pp. 322 ff. Ellwood criticizes Baldwin's views of imitation in his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. xiii.

3. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 635-6.

4. *The Individual and Society*, pp. 155-6.

moral and social ends—this is the direction that nature itself pursues in social evolution. We may, therefore, lend a helping hand to the car of progress by utilizing the resources of thought, invention, and morality, and bring in a period of better things."¹ Baldwin thus gives at least moderate approval to Lester F. Ward's notion of social telesis.

Baldwin considers in some detail the problems of social control :

The individual's thought or judgment is 'controlled' by the facts he is dealing with, on the one hand, and by the customs, habits, social and disciplinary conventions, and so forth, under which he does his thinking. He cannot use his judgment fruitfully without recognizing these elements of control.²

Social control is exerted chiefly through social institutions which furnish the sanctions for conduct :—

The institution is only the permanent form in which the organization of members of a group embodies itself for carrying on its social function. The school, the state, the church, are typical institutions thus understood. The essential thing is not the external form, the means by which it accomplishes its end, but the type of collective interest and action it devotes itself to and fulfils.³

There are four general types of institutions which furnish social sanctions—natural institutions, pedagogical and conventional institutions, civil institutions, and ethical and religious institutions.⁴ Natural institutions are those which "arise directly out of the nature of man" and are best exemplified by the family.⁵ The pedagogical and conventional institutions "prepare the individual for his social place and rôle" and are represented by the school in a broad sense.⁶ Civil institutions are designed to curb the "undue operation of the individualistic factor" and are represented by the state and its agent the government.⁷ Ethical and religious institutions are less utilitarian than the first three types and exist to develop sentimental agencies for social control. They are represented chiefly by public opinion and the church.⁸

Baldwin sets forth his specific psychological interpretation of the state and government in the following manner : The natural and pedagogical institutions of society reduce to a large degree the extreme egoistic and individualistic tendencies, advance socialization and prepare mankind for co-operative endeavour. Yet some form of external constraint is necessary for the most effective group co-operation and to curb the disintegrating tendencies of imperfectly socialized individuals. Government constitutes the only agency adequate to insure the most complete degree of collective activity through co-operative endeavour. Yet, political constraint is but the means to an end, and administration of collective interests rather

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-4.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff.; *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 416 ff.

5. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 415-22.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 422-30; *Individual and Society*, pp. 123-35.

7. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 430-43; *Individual and Society*, pp. 127-35.

8. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 443-55; *Individual and Society*, pp. 137-44.

than constraint is the chief function of government. Government is not created by a contract; it is an agreement which implies social self-consciousness and the recognition of the necessity for an adequate institution for furthering and perfecting group co-operation. Owing to the dependence of government upon this social self-consciousness the forms of government change with alterations in the type of social self-consciousness :—¹

In the main we may say, therefore, that the pedagogical institutions of society are socializing and collectivistic. They aim to preserve the type of "socius," or citizen, that the system of things requires. This necessitates the development of the individual along lines that reduce his eccentricity and train his powers into conformity to the standards of social usage and common life. . . .

This is true to even a greater extent of the institutions of government. They are of necessity conserving and conservative. The need of self-control in the individual is felt first of all in the social body; its utility is social more than individual. The unrestrained exercise of personal powers, of the more instinctive and impulsive sort, might often seem to serve the immediate advantage of the individual. But society points out the wider unit, the larger utility, afforded by co-operation and union. It is for society, then, to secure this by constraining the individuals who do not recognize it. So the exercise of some sort of constraint upon the individuals who need it is the condition of effective social organisation. Social control and self-control go hand in hand.

This does not commit us to a theory of government which makes constraint the essence of society: the fundamental motive of social organization is not in my opinion "constraint." On the contrary, all fruitful constraint assumes a sort of social bond. The need and the advantage of social union and co-operation must be felt in order that its lack or its impairment may come home to individuals. Granted, on the other hand, the growing bonds of social interest and life, then the need of restraining the more unsocial and individualistic tendencies of individuals becomes apparent. Thus arises the recognition of the function of the many to use what means it may to secure the widest and most effective co-operation. . . .

It appears evident, also, from this consideration, that government is not a matter of formal consent or contract; it is a means of conserving a state or fact and a state of mind already recognized as existing.

If government were only with "the consent of the governed," there would be no need of government. Such a consent is a result, not a cause. The fact of government is the external side of the state of mind by which the individuals of a group come into their status with reference to one another; the status in which the socii reciprocate in varying degrees the feeling of concession and co-operation which growing self-consciousness implicates. This growth is unequal, varying, less or more developed; while the demands of social utility are urgent and compelling. The result is the civil and pedagogical rule, in which the element of authority, with its correlative obedience, plays a conspicuous part.

This element—the enforcing of social rule or law with penalties of various sorts—embodies itself in institutions of separate form and sanction. This is government. It is the authority of the social group as such recognized as enforced by and upon individuals. It is effective or it could not be established; it is compulsory, or it would not be effective.

Government, then, is the explicit form in which the actual bonds existing in a group are made authoritative and are enforced upon individuals. The greater part of the function of government, however, we should not overlook, is administrative, not coercive. It is mainly an instrument of social procedure, not one of social constraint. There is the consent of the governed in all that in which they do not come into conflict with the established authority; and this covers, for most civilized men, the whole of their lives and all the details of their lives. No one but the law-breaker fears the law.

The form of government changes with development in the form of the social self-consciousness. The ruder societies show most constraint, and have the most brutal procedure of administration; these are the reflex of the cruder forms of solidarity and community which are not yet tolerant, imitative, or reflective. Legislation is undeveloped, and executive action is autocratic and peremptory.

As society advances, the more psychological factors tend to release the group from its bondage to animal brutality, and from the biological sanctions of appetite,

1. *The Individual and Society*, pp. 127-135.

force, individual passion, and ambition; and the more administrative and popular forms of government appear. The stages seem to be in type from absolute despotism, through various modes of constitutionalism, to representative government and democracy. How far democracy succeeds seems to depend upon the relative social and political virtue of the people. If government is ever to dispense with an authority that may, on occasion, assert itself without the ratification of its decrees by the popular voice, it must be when and because that voice is not necessary.

The significance of Baldwin's work for social and political theory is that he severely challenges the conventional doctrine that social and political institutions are erected at the expense of individuality and that the problem in the situation is to discover a compromise between two distinct sets of interests. Probably no modern writer on social psychology, with the possible exception of Charles H. Cooley, has done more to emphasize this essential point. Further, he offers a mechanism, however imperfect, for explaining the reciprocal development of the individual personality and social and political institutions.

D. The Development of Ethnic or Folk-Psychology in the United States. The development of ethnic or folk-psychology in Europe by Waitz, Lazarus, Steinthal and their followers in Germany and other countries was paralleled to some degree in the United States. The best statement of the American version of the older point of view in ethnic psychology is probably that contained in Daniel Garrison Brinton's *The Basis of Social Relations*. Brinton (1837-1899) was one of the ablest of the early American anthropologists who were comparable in the development of the science to such European writers as Tylor, Lubbock, Spencer, Letourneau and Post. Calling attention to the previous work done in this field by Bastian, Waitz, Lazarus, Steinthal and others, Brinton remarked that "it is strange that not in any language has there been published a systematic treatise on Ethnic Psychology; strange because its students claim that it is the key to ethnology, the sure interpreter of history, and the only solid basis for constructive sociology."² In the work mentioned above Brinton aspired to supply this lacking treatise. Ethnic psychology he defined as that branch of the subject which treats of the mental phenomena which are found in the mass or group mind and not in the individual mind.

"Ethnic psychology deals with collections of facts, feelings, thoughts, and historic events, and seeks by comparison and analysis to discover their causal relations. It is wholly objective, and for that reason eminently a 'natural' science. The objective truths with which it deals are not primary but secondary mental products, as they are not attached to the individual but to the group. . . . The ethnic *psyche* is made up of a number of experiences common to the mass, but not occurring in any one of its individual members.

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-133.

2. *The Basis of Social Relations*, Introduction, p. vii, and pp. 15, 158.

These experiences of the aggregate develop their own variations and modes of progress, and must be studied for themselves, without reference to the individual, holding the processes of the single mind as analogies only."¹ The general subject falls into two divisions, the "natural" and the "cultural" history of the ethnic mind. The former embraces "the consideration of those general doctrines of continuity and variation which hold true alike in matter and in mind, in the soul as in the body, and a review of the known forces which, acting through the physical structure and function upon the organs which are the vehicles of mental phenomena, weaken or strengthen the psychical activities." The latter is concerned with "a classification of all ethnologic data as the products of a few general concepts, universal to the human mind, but conditioned in their expressions by the natural history of each group."²

We cannot give space to a detailed consideration of Brinton's analysis of the genesis of the ethnic mind, but his chief theses may be briefly summarized. These are that there is a fundamental unity of the human mind both in time and geographical distribution, that the group mind is a reality, and that the individual mind is dominated by the group mind, which is the condition of all progress. The basic doctrine of Brinton with respect to the unity of the human mind is set forth in the following manner:—

These two principles, or rather demonstrated truths,—the unity of the mind of man, and the substantial uniformity of its action under like conditions,—form the broad and secure foundation for Ethnic Psychology. They confirm the validity of its results and guarantee its methods.

As there are conditions which are universal, such as the structure and functions of the body, its general relations to its surroundings, its needs and powers, these developed everywhere at first the like psychical activities, or mental expressions. They constitute what Bastian has happily called the "elementary ideas" of our species. In all races, over all continents, they present themselves with a wonderful sameness, which led the older students of man to the fallacious supposition that they must have been borrowed from some common centre.³

Nor are they easily obliterated under the stress of new experiences and changed conditions. With that tenacity of life which characterizes simple and primitive forms, they persist through periods of divergent and higher culture, hiding under venerable beliefs, emerging with fresh disguises, but easily detected as but repetitions of the dear primordial faiths of the race.⁴

That intellectual actions are governed by fixed laws was long ago said and demonstrated by Quetelet in his remarkable studies of vital statistics. That the development of thought proceeds "under the rule of an iron necessity" is the ripened conviction of that profound student of man, Bastian. We must accept it as the verdict of science.⁵

The only significant variations in the culture and elementary ideas of mankind have been those which were the result of a different geographical and social environment. "Where such externals were alike, or nearly so, the progress was parallel; where unlike it was divergent; analogous in this to well-known doctrines of the biologist."⁶

1. *Ibid.*, pp. xii-xiii.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv.

3. This older view has, of course, reappeared under the category of the diffusion of culture in the writings of Graeber, Elliot Smith and Rivers.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

While agreeing that it could not exist without the minds of the individuals in the group, Brinton was a firm believer in the reality of the group mind, and held that the phenomena of the group mind constituted the sole object of investigation for ethnic psychology:

This science of ours, ethnic psychology, has, in one sense, nothing to do with the individual. It does not start from his mind or thoughts but from the mind of the group; its laws are those of the group only, and in no wise true of the individual; it omits wide tracts of activities which belong to the individual and embraces others in which he has no share; to the extent that it does study him, it is solely in his relation to others, and not in the least for himself.

On the other hand, as the group is a generic concept only, it has no objective existence. It lives only in the individuals who compose it; and only by studying them singly can we reach any fact or principle which is true of them in the aggregate.

Yet it is almost as correct to maintain that the group is that which alone of the two is real. The closer we study the individual, the more do his alleged individualities cease, as such, and disappear in the general laws by virtue of which society exists; the less baggage does he prove to have which is really his own; the more do all his thoughts, traits, and features turn out to be those of others; so that, as last, he melts into the mass, and there is nothing left which he has a right to claim as his personal property. His pretended personal mind is the reflex of the group minds around him, as his body is in every fibre and cell the repetition of his species and race. . . .

The actual existence of the group mind can no more be denied than the constant inter-relation between it and the individual mind. It takes nothing from its reality that it exists only in individual wills. To deny it on that account, as Wundt admirably says, is as illogical as to deny the existence of a building because the single stones of which it is composed may be removed. Indeed, it might claim higher reality than the individual mind in that its will is more potent and can attain greater results by collective action.

Of course there is no metaphysical "substance" or mythological "being" behind the collective mind. That were a nonsensical notion. Nor is it in any sense a voluntary invention, created by contract for utilitarian ends. That were a gross misconception. It is the actual agreement and interaction of individuals resulting in mental modes, tendencies, and powers not belonging to any one member, and moving under laws developed by the requirements of this independent existence.⁵

While the individual is less important for ethnic psychology than the group he is not a negligible factor. It may be true that "he submits his will to the collective will, his consciousness to the collective consciousness. He accepts from the group the ideas, conclusions, and opinions common to it, and the motives of volition, such as customs and rules of conduct, which it collectively sanctions."³ Nevertheless, individual initiative is the original source of all progress, and the most advanced peoples have been those who have allowed the freest play to individual initiative.⁴ Rather the process of cultural development is one of mutual interaction between the individual and the group:—

The individual receives from the group the symbols for complex and general ideas—that is, the words of language; he is also taught many complex purposeful motions, such as are needed in social and cultured life; he is supplied with artificial objects for his use, as tools, clothing, shelter, etc.; and he is constantly subjected to a certain amount of physical force from those around him—in other words, is "made to do" a variety of acts. The group may consciously strive to modify him, as in public education, religious instruction, and the like; or it may act merely negatively in opposing any developments antagonistic to its own character. The individual may work for or against the group, or for himself only; but in either case has to reckon with the group for what he obtains from it.²

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 28; W. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 27, 55 f., 66.

3. Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Finally, Brinton at least feebly anticipated the present scientific viewpoint of Boas and his followers to the effect that there is no proved inherent biological or psychological superiority of any one race over another or of civilized over primitive man. He contends that "human groups have differed less in inherent psychical capacity than in stimuli and opportunities."¹ In conclusion, it may be said that Brinton's work is a strong and perhaps exaggerated statement of a basic element in modern anthropological science, namely, the unity of the human mind. Some of his associated doctrines as to the nature of geographical and psychological determinism, the relation of the individual to his group, and the content and development of culture have been greatly modified by the results of more recent anthropological research and formulation of doctrine.²

G. Stanley Hall, in his genetic psychology with its view of the analogy between the child and the savage mind, was naturally led into a consideration of folk-psychology. In chapter eighteen of his classic work on *Adolescence* he goes into a long discussion of the data and theories of ethnic psychology, and he always maintained a close contact with the progress of anthropological doctrine. Further, he founded the first department of anthropology in America, and maintained this department for years as an indispensable supplement to work in genetic psychology and pedagogy.

The most important contribution that the Clark group made to anthropology and folk-psychology was contained, however, in the work of Alexander Francis Chamberlain (1863-1914), who filled the chair of anthropology from the time of Professor Boas' retirement until his death in 1914.³ In two notable works on *The Child and Childhood in Folk-Thought* and *The Child: a Study in the Evolution of Man*, he presented the most thorough ethnographic study of childhood which has ever been attempted. Yet he did not agree with President Hall's biological orientation in psychology or admit the pedagogical soundness of the law of psychic recapitulation. Probably in part due to the influence of Professor Boas, of whom Chamberlain was the first American student, he regarded culture and primitive life as much more a matter for psychological analysis than for biological analogy. He was, however, even far more than Hall a believer in nature and the child as the ideal guides for conduct and education. Chamberlain also foreshadowed Boas in his belief that the differences between races and between primitive and civilized men were those which depended upon historical oppor-

1. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

2. Professor Brinton was also widely known for his work *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, which was based in large part upon his theory of ethnic psychology.

3. There is a good brief appreciation of the services of Professor Chamberlain to cultural anthropology and ethnic psychology in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVI, 1914, pp. 337-46. It includes a complete bibliography of his writings. Testimonials from representative scholars are contained in the Clark University Memorial Publication, October 1914.

tunity rather than upon inherent biological and psychological divergence.¹ As a specialist in anthropology Chamberlain was best known for his remarkable work in the bibliography of the subject and for his investigations in linguistics, which were both intensive, as in the case of his work on the Kootenay Indians, and extensive, as in his classification of the languages of the natives of South America.

Probably the greatest honour that Clark University can claim in the history of anthropology and folk-psychology is the fact that it offered the first academic position to the man who has by the volume, variety and scholarship of his work easily earned the first place among all modern anthropologists, Franz Boas. It can probably be said with entire accuracy that Boas has been the only anthropologist who has completely mastered every field of anthropological study and has at the same time been the leader in introducing rigorous scientific methods into each division of the subject. Trained originally in Germany as a physicist, his first important scientific work was in anthropogeography as a student of the cultural influences of arctic climate. Almost accidentally he was turned aside from a career as a professional psychologist and diverted into anthropology. Here he has distinguished himself as the director of the most fruitful concrete ethnographic investigation conducted in America, the *Jesup North Pacific Expedition*; as the founder of scientific primitive linguistics and as editor of the *Handbook of American Indian Languages*; as a physical anthropologist by his *Changes in the Form of Body of the Descendants of Immigrants*, and by his famous course on the races of Europe at Columbia University; and, above all, as the formulator of modern critical anthropological methodology through his work in statistical anthropometry, his insistence upon the true inductive method in arriving at anthropological generalizations, and his establishment of the historic-cultural method in approaching the problems of ethnology.²

Professor Boas has summarized most of his theoretical positions in his *Mind of Primitive Man*. He contends that there is no scientific proof for the current doctrine that cultural achievement measures mental ability, and maintains that cultural variations and differences are due to historic rather than biological causes, and that the white race is not scientifically proved to be the most gifted of the races psychologically and most highly developed biologically.³ While admitting that the geographical environment may alter the bodily form of inhabitants, he contends that the manner or degree

1. Cf. "The Contribution of the American Indian to Human Civilization," in *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, 1903, pp. 91-136; and "The Contribution of the Negro to Human Civilization," in the *Journal of Race Development*, 1911, pp. 489-500.

2. For a bibliography of Professor Boas' writings to 1906 see the *Boas Memorial Volume*, pp. 515 ff.

3. *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 1-29.

of modification is not certain and that there is no complete determination of culture by geographical surroundings.¹ He supports the doctrine of the unity of the human mind and maintains that there is no marked difference between primitive and modern man as to the degree of development of the native mental faculties. The differences in culture are due to variations in opportunity for development.² He holds that there is no correlation between race, language and culture, thus completely disposing of the whole ground for the monstrosities of the Aryan myth and many other related or similar race prejudices.³ Most important for cultural anthropology is his position that there is no universal or single key to the explanation of cultural parallelisms. Apparent similarities may have proceeded from quite different antecedents, and probably both independent development and diffusion must be recognized in the production of cultural parallelisms.⁴ In studying the mental and cultural traits of primitive peoples care must be taken to enter as far as possible into the point of view of the savage and to interpret the particular cultural institution in its relation to the whole cultural complex of which it is an integral part.⁵ In this way Professor Boas demolishes an imposing structure of errors erected by Spencer, Frazer, Letourneau and the classical anthropologists, and sets forth the sound principles upon which future ethnic psychology and cultural anthropology must build.

The two chief contributions of these doctrines of Chamberlain and Boas, which deny differences in mental potentiality and capacity between races and cultures, to political theory and practice are that political institutions are purely a product of cultural circumstances and not of biological or psychological advances and that modern imperialism has been founded upon a false premise, in so far as it assumes the superiority of the white races over others or of civilized man over primitive man in any other than a technological sense.

Many of Professor Boas' cardinal contributions to the newer critical anthropology and ethnic psychology have been further developed by his students and disciples, from whom we may select Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser and Kroeber. Dr. Clark Wissler has attacked the identification of anthropological method and data with the method and data of biology and has forcefully contended that culture is something which must be explained by history and psychology. While recognizing that the general intellectual impetus of Darwinism alone made anthropology possible, he holds that anthropology cannot accept the doctrine that "cultural phenomena are a part of, parallel to, or continuous with, biological

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-75, 159-64.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-123.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-154.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-190. Cf. "The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology," in *Science*, Vol. IV, 1894, pp. 901-8.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-243.

phenomena."¹ Except for occasional mutations biological changes proceed in an orderly genetic manner and are sharply conditioned by preceding types. On the other hand, cultural development does not proceed in the logical sequence analogous to biological development, as Morgan once supposed. Because two contemporaneous peoples show apparent identity of culture in a certain aspect of the total cultural complex it cannot be safely assumed that the antecedents of these similarities were identical in both groups or that their subsequent development will be the same. Further, mere identity of certain phases of material culture in no way establishes the fact that the two groups have the same subjective interpretation of these similarities. In other words, the whole cultural problem in anthropology is primarily one for history and psychology to settle. The following is, perhaps, Dr. Wissler's most adequate summary of his position :—

In general we may formulate our interpretation of the historical conception of anthropology by renaming it the cultural point of view. Culture itself seems to be associated habit-complexes or constructs of the mind and not to be in any way innate or inborn, but to be an external affair, preserved and carried on entirely by learning or educating processes. Cultures develop and have an evolution of their own, but since they are not inherited they cannot be considered parts of a biological development. They are most assuredly facts of another order. Being products of the mind, the only limitations put upon them are to be sought in the mind itself, and since psychologists tell us that we have in the main only an associated cultural whole, resolvable into psychological elements, and since this in turn is only a matter of relation in time and attributes, we may reject the idea that cultures are predetermined or follow any design within the psychological limits imposed by life. If, then, there is an evolution of culture, it is to be conceived only in logical or psychological terms. There is, for example, a kind of genetic relationship between the flint chip and the razor, but it is a matter of invention and not of cell differentiation. Being a matter of invention, the genetic relationship becomes purely a matter of history, since we cannot foretell what the relationship is.

We have seen that there is a clear distinction between cultures on the one hand and the psycho-physical mechanisms that produce them on the other. The mechanisms are biological and are innate and constitute man's equipment for the production of cultures. Anthropology holds that the mechanism is general, in so far as it is not limited to any particular culture, and that it enables the individual to practice any culture he may meet, though not necessarily to equal degrees.

When we come to consider the biological theory of evolution, we find that it applies to the psycho-physical mechanism but not to culture. For cultures we must have another point of view or theory, and this in America at least is the historical or cultural conception. This conception is in general that cultural traits are the results of invention, a mental process, and their development or evolution is to be taken as a historical and psychological problem. In this cultural conception and all that it implies, anthropology has an insight into the phenomena of its chosen field, as vitalizing to it as Darwinism is to zoölogy.²

The divergence from biological psychology and the evolutionist anthropology becomes still more marked in the work of Dr. Robert H. Lowie. Proclaiming that "culture is the sole and exclusive subject-matter of ethnology," he will not admit that even psychology is adequate to solve the problems of ethnology. While granting that the psychologist can render much aid in helping to explain

1. Clark Wissler, "The Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology," in *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July 1913, pp. 228-37.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-37. Cf. "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture," in *Science*, Vol. 43, 1916, pp. 193-201. Dr. Wissler in his *American Indian* has contributed by far the best synthesis of the indigenous culture of North America.

specific situations in which psychological factors are evidently present, he contends that only ethnology, the science of human culture, is capable of explaining and interpreting culture as a totality. The cultural complex is something *sui generis* and no science auxiliary to ethnology is equal to the task of its analysis:—

My conclusions as to the relation of psychology to culture are, accordingly, the following: The cultural facts, even in their subjective aspect, are not merged in psychological facts. They must not, indeed, contravene psychological principles, but the same applies to all other principles of the universe; culture cannot construct houses contrary to the laws of gravitation nor produce bread out of stones. But the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of culture as is gravitation to account for architectural styles. Over and above the interpretations given by psychology, there is an irreducible residuum of huge magnitude that calls for special treatment and by its very existence vindicates the *raison d'être* of ethnology. We need not eschew any help given by scientific psychology for the comprehension of specifically psychological components of cultural phenomena; but as no one dreams of saying that these phenomena are reduced to chemical principles when chemistry furnishes us with an analysis of Peruvian bronze implements, so no one can dare to assert that they are reduced to psychological principles when we call upon psychology to elucidate specific features of cultural complexes. The "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" constitute a distinct field of reality that must be the field of a distinct science autonomous with reference to psychology.¹

We cannot here go into any discussion of the leading problems of theoretical ethnology, but it should be mentioned in passing that Dr. Lowie's article on "The Principle of Convergence in Ethnology"² is one of the half-dozen cardinal contributions to modern ethnological method and synthesis. Its chief service is to provide a critical foundation for an analysis of cultural parallelisms by showing the necessity of establishing psychological as well as material identity before assuming parallelism as a fact. As a specialist in ethnology Dr. Lowie has been distinguished for his work on social organization. His *Primitive Society* is altogether the best synthesis of the newer evidence and completely displaces Morgan's antiquated treatise on *Ancient Society*.

Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser has probably attacked a wider range of anthropological problems from the newer point of view than any other student of Professor Boas. His most significant work has been done in the study of religion. In his *Totemism, An Analytical Study*, he examined the current theories in the light of the concrete material available in Australian and North-west Pacific Coast data, and found that none of the assumed criteria of the totemic complex were vindicated by the concrete evidence. He came to the conclusion that one could not accurately be more specific than to define totemism as "the tendency of definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols of emotional value."³ He has further contributed much to the field of primitive religion by critical

1. *Culture and Ethnology*, pp. 25-6. Cf. "Psychology and Sociology," in *American Journal of Sociology*, 1915, pp. 217-29.

2. *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1912, pp. 28-42.

3. *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, April-June, 1910, p. 275.

studies¹ and constructive formulations of doctrine.² In theory and methodology his article on "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture" is one of the best statements of the newer critical historico-psychological position.³ His best work on social organization, that dealing with the Iroquois, has not been published, but his article on "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America" shows a wide knowledge of the literature and a firm grasp upon the results of recent investigation and conclusions.⁴ In a critical article on "The Knowledge of Primitive Man" he contends that we have probably exaggerated the illogicality and irrationality of primitive thought and that "we may come to conceive of intellectual progress, from savagery to civilization, not as an evolution of mentality, but as a continuous accumulation of positive knowledge and a correlated advancement in the degree to which such knowledge determines thought."⁵ Finally, he has attempted to work out a set of categories for social science from the psychological and ethnological point of view.⁶

Undoubtedly the most thoroughgoing and uncompromising attack upon conventional anthropology and ethnic psychology has been made by Professor Alfred L. Kroeber. In a brief and pointed manifesto entitled "Eighteen Professions" he offers in a series of propositions what almost amounts to a categorical denial of nearly every basic thesis of ethnic psychology, genetic psychology and classical or evolutionary anthropology.⁷ His argument was still further elaborated in a lengthy article on "The Superorganic."⁸ Agreeing with the point of view of Dr. Lowie that ethnology is a social science with culture as its chief object of investigation, he contends that neither biology nor psychology can solve the problems of cultural characteristics or transformations, that ethnology can in no way concern itself with differences in individual capacity, that the realm of the social and the cultural is *sui generis*—"not a link in any chain, nor a step in a path, but a leap into another plane,"—and that culture is "culturally determined."

Here, then, we have come to our conclusion; and here we rest. The mind and the body are but facets of the same organic material or activity; the social substance—or unsubstantial fabric, if one prefers the phrase,—the existence that we call civilization, transcends them utterly for all its being forever rooted in life. The processes of civilizational activity are almost unknown to us. The self-sufficient factors that govern their workings are unresolved. The forces and principles of mechanistic science can indeed analyse our civilization; but in so doing they destroy its essence, and leave us without understanding of the very thing which we seek. The historian as yet can do little but picture. He traces and he connects what

1. E.g., "Religion and Society," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, March 1, 1917.

2. E.g., "Spirit, Mana, and the Religious Thrill," *Ibid.*, November 11, 1915.

3. *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, July-September 1913.

4. *Ibid.*, October-December, 1914.

5. *American Anthropologist*, April-June 1915, pp. 240-44.

6. History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, October 10, 24, 1918.

7. *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 17, 1915, pp. 223-38.

8. *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, 1917, pp. 165-818.

seems far removed ; he balances ; he integrates ; but he does not really explain, nor does he transmute phenomena into something else. His method is not science ; but neither can the scientist deal with historical material and leave civilization, nor anything resembling civilization, nor convert it wholly into concepts of life and leave nothing else to be done. What we all are able to do is to realise this gap, to be impressed by its abyss with reverence and humility, and to go our paths on its respective sides without self-deluding attempts to bridge the eternal chasm, or empty boasts that its span is achieved.¹

The significance of the writings of the critical or analytical school of American cultural anthropologists or ethnologists for social and political theory lies chiefly in their demonstration of the inadequacy of either biology or psychology to serve as the sole instrument for interpreting culture and social institutions. While both may aid in this type of problems they are but auxiliary sciences, and only social science is competent to handle social and cultural problems. Their work constitutes the most closely reasoned criticism of the older attempt to solve social and political problems by the use of biological formulæ and analogies and the more recent effort to find the key to social science in psychology. Yet, far from condemning the utilization of psychology, this school calls for a wider use of it, provided that its limitations are always realized.

The attack upon the comparative method in ethnic psychology has not been limited to Boas and the critical anthropologists. Professor John Dewey in a notable article on the "Interpretation of Savage Mind" sharply criticized the abuses of the comparative method as exemplified in the work of such a writer as Spencer. He complained that facts were torn from their context, that only unrelated facts of mind and no coherent scheme or pattern of mind could be discovered by this method, and that there was no possibility of a dynamic approach to the subject which would indicate the changes in mental patterns.² He maintained that a genetic psychology of the mind must approach the subject with the aim of discovering the psychic patterns designed to meet the needs of different types of life and the elements which have led to the alteration of these patterns.

The psychical attitudes and traits of the savage are more than stages through which mind has passed, leaving them behind. They are outgrowths which have entered decisively into further evolution, and as such form an integral part of the framework of present mental organization. Such positive significance is commonly attributed, in theory at least, to animal mind ; but the mental structure of the savage, which presumably has even greater relevancy for genetic psychology, is strangely neglected. . . .

Our standpoint must be more positive. We must recognize that mind has a pattern, a scheme of arrangement in its constituent elements, and that it is the business of a serious comparative psychology to exhibit these patterns, form or types in detail. By such terms, I do not mean anything metaphysical ; I mean to indicate the necessity of a conception such as is a commonplace with the zoologist. Terms like articulate or vertebrate, carnivore or herbivore, are 'pattern' terms of the sort intended. They imply that an animal is something more than a random composite of isolated parts, made by taking an eye here, an ear there, a set of teeth somewhere else. They signify that the constituent elements are arranged in a certain way ;

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

2. *The Psychological Review*, May 1902, pp. 917-20.

that in being co-adapted to the dominant functions of the organism they are of necessity co-related with one another. Genetic psychology of mind will advance only as it discovers and specifies generic forms or patterns of this sort in psychic morphology.

It is a method for the determination of such types that I wish to suggest in this paper. The biological point of view commits us to the conviction that mind, whatever else it may be, is at least an organ of service for the control of environment in relation to the ends of the life process.

If we search in any social group for the special functions to which mind is thus relative, occupations at once suggest themselves. Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits. These habits, in turn, are something more than practical and overt. 'Apperceptive masses' and associational tracts of necessity conform to the dominant activities. The occupations determine the chief modes of satisfaction, the standards of success and failure. Hence they furnish the working classifications and definitions of value; they control the desire processes. Moreover, they decide the sets of objects and relations that are important, and thereby provide the content or material of attention, and the qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intellectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of mental traits. Occupations integrate special elements into a functioning whole.

Because the hunting life differs from, say, the agricultural, in the sort of satisfactions and ends it furnishes, in the objects to which it requires attention, in the problems it sets for reflection and deliberation, as well as in the psycho-physical coördination it stimulates and selects, we may well speak, and without metaphor, of the hunting psychosis or mental type. And so of the pastoral, the military, the trading, the manually productive (or manufacturing) occupations, and so on.¹

E. Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-) and the Native Equipment of Man. Among American psychologists the pioneer in the application of experimental psychology to a study of animal behaviour and an analysis of the "original nature of man" has been Professor E. L. Thorndike of Columbia University. In a way he has combined the type of contribution to psychology which has been made in England by C. Lloyd Morgan and William McDougall. Yet he represents a somewhat more advanced stage in the evolution of the science—a more rigorous application of and a greater dependence upon the purely experimental method and less utilization of the philosophical and dialectic mode of approach. His most important contributions to animal psychology were incorporated in the volume on *Animal Intelligence*. In this work he disposed of two persistent assumptions of psychological sociologists, namely, the belief that animals have a general tendency towards imitation and possess a social consciousness. He contends that his experiments tended to prove that there is no general tendency on the part of animals to imitate each other, and that they have no true social consciousness, namely, a consciousness of the feelings of their fellows.² Much more important for political and social psychology, however, is his attempt to discover, describe and catalogue those "unlearned tendencies," those "reflexes, instincts, and inborn capacities" which go to make up the "original nature of man."

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Animal Intelligence, Experimental Studies*, pp. 76-96, 146-7.

The "original nature of man" or his native equipment consists of those unlearned tendencies with which he starts his career and which are in no way dependent upon facts of his immediate social or natural environment. His subsequent life and activities are a product of the reciprocal action of this original equipment and the social and geographical environment. Hence the necessity of ascertaining the exact nature of man's unlearned tendencies, so that the problem of their adequacy as a guide for educational and social policy may be considered, as well as the problem of the desirability and degree of their possible modification through pedagogical and social effort.

Any man possesses at the very start of his life—that is, at the moment when the ovum and spermatozoon which are to produce him are united—numerous well-defined tendencies to future behaviour. Between the situations which he will meet and the responses which he will make to them, pre-formed bonds exist. It is already determined by the constitution of these two germs, that under certain circumstances he will see and hear and feel and act in certain ways. His intellect and morals, as well as his bodily organs and movements, are in part the consequence of the nature of the embryo in the first moment of its life. What a man is and does throughout life is a result of whatever constitution he has at the start and of all the forces that act upon it before and after birth. I shall use the term 'original nature' for the former and 'environment' for the latter. His original nature is thus a name for the nature of the combined germ-cells from which he springs, and his environment is a name for the rest of the universe, so far as it may, directly or indirectly, influence him.¹

It certainly is impossible to summarize the original nature of man without great risk of misleading. The inventory which has been made is, indeed, itself, too condensed to do full justice to the elaborate mental organization with which man meets his environment. But, accepting the risk, one may say that the original nature of man is roughly what is common to all men *minus* all adaptations to tools, houses, clothes, furniture, words, beliefs, religions, laws, science, the arts, and to whatever in other man's behaviour is due to adaptations to them. From human nature as we find it, take away, first, all that is in the European but not in the Chinaman, all that is in the Fiji Islander but not in the Esquimaux, all that is local or temporary. Then take away the effects of all products of human art. What is left of human intellect and character is largely original—not wholly, for all those elements of knowledge which we call ideas and judgments must be subtracted from 'his responses. Man originally possesses only capacities which after a given amount of education will produce ideas and judgments. And from the situations to which he originally responds, must also be subtracted all ideas and judgments; for, again, his original tendencies are bound only to direct sense-presentations and feelings. To ideas, when he gets them, he responds originally only as he would to some direct presentations which they sufficiently resemble. Much, perhaps nine-tenths, of what commonly passes for distinctively human nature is thus not in man originally, but is put there by institutions or grows there by the interaction of the world of natural forces and the capacity to learn. To reduce the chances of misleading, the original nature of man may be summarized also by listing its essential differences from that of the primates in general. Consider the intellectual and moral equipment of the monkeys. Add to it certain important social instincts, notably those connected with the more refined facial expressions and the approval-disapproval series. Increase in intensity and breadth the satisfyingness of mental life for its own sake, widen the repertory of movements to include human facial expressions, finger and thumb play and articulated babble, enrich the fund of indifferent possibilities of secondary connections and give them the tendency to piece-meal action in very fine detail. The result will be substantially the original nature of man.²

It is a first principle of education to utilize any individual's original nature as a means to changing him for the better—to produce in him the information, habits, powers, interests and ideals which are desirable.

The behaviour of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion and in every other affair of life is rooted in his unlearned, original equipment of instincts

1. *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 1-2.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

and capacities. All schemes of improving human life must take account of man's original nature, most of all when their aim is to reverse or counteract it.

A study of the original nature of man as a species and of the original natures of individual men is therefore the primary task of human psychology. This volume is concerned with only the former task. The main topics of such a study are:

1. The description and classification of original tendencies.
2. Their anatomy and physiology.
3. Their source or origin.
4. The order and dates of their appearance and disappearance; and
5. Their control in the service of human ideals.¹

Thorndike discusses in some detail the nature, origins and operation of these unlearned tendencies of man, but we cannot follow him here on account of the concrete nature of the material and the wide citation of leading students of the various phases of the subject.² There are, however, certain phases of this material to which at least brief attention must be devoted. It is in his discussion of the social instincts that Thorndike reflects most fully the influence of William James and approaches more closely to the ground covered by McDougall. He considers the instinct of motherly behaviour, the gregarious instinct with its results in the pleasure of association, the thrills of group approval and the misery of group scorn, the instinct of mastery or submission, depending upon the respective size, sex and age of the individuals concerned, sex behaviour, secretiveness, rivalry, co-operation, suggestibility and opposition, greed, ownership, kindliness, teasing, tormenting and bullying, constructiveness, cleanliness, curiosity, multiform mental and physical activity, workmanship and play.³ This is, perhaps, the most comprehensive catalogue of alleged instinctive tendencies which has been set forth by any psychologist of repute and has been sharply criticized by some on this very account.

Perhaps the most significant of Thorndike's contentions for psychological sociology is that there is no such thing as an original tendency in man to imitate. He criticizes Tarde sharply for his undoubted looseness and ambiguity in the use of the term, and concludes that—

I can find no evidence that any such tendency (to imitate) is original in man. As will be stated later, certain particular sorts of behaviour do originally provoke in the spectator behaviour that resembles them, but, so far as I can see, behaviour in general does not. . . .

On the whole, the imitative tendencies which pervade human life and which are among the most powerful forces with and against which education and social reform work, are, for the most part, not original tendencies to respond to behaviour seen by duplicating it in the same mechanical way that one responds to light by contracting the pupil, but must be explained as the results of the arousal, by the behaviour of other men, of either special instinctive responses or ideas and impulses which have formed in the course of experience, connections with that sort of behaviour. Man has a few specialized original tendencies whose responses are for him to do what the man forming the situation does. His other tendencies to imitate are habits learned nowise differently from other habits.

The most probable cases for the production, by behaviour witnessed, of similar

1. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

2. *Ibid.*, *pussim*, especially Chaps. v-xi, xiv-xvi.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-107, 138-40.

behaviour in the witness, are smiling when smiled at, laughing when others laugh, yelling when others yell, looking at what others observe, listening when others listen, running with or after people who are running in the same direction, running from the focus whence others scatter, jabbering when others jabber and becoming silent as they become silent, crouching when others crouch, chasing, attacking and rending what others hunt, and seizing whatever object another seizes.¹

Finally, Thorndike takes up the question, answered in the affirmative by Rousseau, as to whether the impulses from man's original nature are a reliable guide for conduct and a suitable criterion for judging ethical codes. While not fully agreeing with either, Thorndike inclines to believe that Stanley Hall and his followers, who regard nature as the safest guide for conduct and education, err less than the absolutist philosophers with their categorical imperatives and their adulation of pure thought spelled with a capital T, who condemn natural impulses on all occasions. The natural impulses are far from perfect and also far from being entirely evil. Progress comes through modifying and improving them by conscious effort and readjusting them to meet the varying needs of an advancing civilization, yet they contain within them the raw material out of which all progress must be constructed.

The original tendencies of man have not been right, are not right, and probably never will be right. By them alone few of the best wants in human life would have been felt, and fewer still satisfied. Nor would the crude, conflicting, perilous wants which original nature so largely represents and serves, have had much more fulfilment. Original nature has achieved what goodness the world knows as a state achieves order, by killing, confining, or reforming some of its elements. It progresses, not by *laissez faire* but by changing the environment in which it operates and by renewedly changing itself in each generation. Man is now as civilized, rational and humane as he is because man in the past has changed things into shapes more satisfying, and changed parts of his own nature into traits more satisfying, to man as a whole. Man is thus eternally altering himself to suit himself. His nature is not right in his own eyes. Only one thing in it, indeed, is unreservedly good, the power to make it better. This power, the power of learning or modification in favour of the satisfying, the capacity represented by the law of effect, is the essential principle of reason and right in the world.²

I have been at some pains to make it clear that the instinctive tendencies of man must often be supplemented, redirected and even reversed, and that, in the ordinary sense of the words, original nature is imperfect and untrustworthy. But in a certain important sense nature is right. . . .

The original nature of man, as we have seen, has its source far back of reason and morality in the interplay of brute forces; it grows up as an agency to keep men, and especially certain neurones within men's bodies alive; it is physiologically determined by the character of the synaptic bonds and degrees of readiness to act of these neurones; parts of it are again and again in rebellion against the higher life that the acquired wisdom of man prescribes. But it has evolved reason and morality from brute force; amongst the neurones whose life it serves are neurones whose life means, if a certain social environment is provided, loving children, being just to all men, seeking the truth, and every other activity that man honours; the wisdom that criticises it is its own product; the higher life is the choice of its better elements: for whatever aberrations and degradations it imposes on man, its own virtues are the preventive and cure: and to it will be due whatever happiness, power and dignity man attains.³

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-22.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-288.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 310-19. For another excellent summary discussion of the field covered by Professor Thorndike in this book see R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*. Chap. iii.

The significance of Professor Thorndike's contribution to political science will be apparent to all who have dealt with the history and analysis of political theory. Political processes grow out of the reciprocal action of man and his social and physical environment, and the "original nature of man" must then be the starting point for any scientific discussion of the nature of political obedience and the wisdom of political policy. Nevertheless, one cannot accept the Rousseauean view that nature is the true and perfect guide, but must admit that human nature has been modified in its reactions by social institutions and that it may be infinitely improved by this very process.

F. John B. Watson (1878-) and the Development of the Behaviouristic Approach to Psychology. One of the most vigorous controversies in the history of modern psychology has been associated with the rise of a new method of approaching the study of psychic phenomena, namely, the behaviouristic attitude. Eschewing any concern with conscious states, introspection, and the subjective aspects of psychic reactions the behaviourists aim to make psychology an objective natural science and seek to introduce a method which would reduce to the common denominator of a single method the investigation of the behaviour of all types of organisms from the amoebae to man. The most valiant exponent of this new method in psychology in America has been Professor John B. Watson of Johns Hopkins University. Watson has summarized in the following manner his chief dogmas as to the essence of behaviourism :—

Human psychology has failed to make good its claim as a natural science. Due to a mistaken notion that its fields of facts are conscious phenomena and that introspection is the only direct method of ascertaining these facts, it has enmeshed itself in a series of speculative questions which, while fundamental to its present tenets, are not open to experimental treatment. In the pursuit of answers to these questions, it has become further and further divorced from contact with problems which vitally concern human interest.

Psychology, as the behaviourist views it, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science, which needs introspection as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics. It is granted that the behaviour of animals can be investigated without appeal to consciousness. Heretofore the viewpoint has been that such data have value only in so far as they can be interpreted by analogy in terms of consciousness. The position is taken here that the behaviour of man and the behaviour of animals must be considered on the same plane; as being equally essential to a general understanding of behaviour. It can dispense with consciousness in a psychological sense. The separate observation of "states of consciousness" is, on this assumption, no more a part of the task of the psychologist than of the physicist. We might call this the return to a non-reflective and naïve use of consciousness. In this sense consciousness may be said to be the instrument or tool with which all scientists work. Whether or no the tool is properly used at present by scientists is a problem for philosophy and not for psychology.

From the viewpoint here suggested the facts on the behaviour of amoebae have value in and for themselves without reference to the behaviour of man. In biology studies on race differentiation and inheritance in amoebae form a separate division of study which must be evaluated in terms of the laws found there. The conclusions so reached may not hold in any other form. Regardless of the possible lack of generality, such studies must be made if evolution as a whole is ever to be

regulated and controlled. Similarly the laws of behaviour in amoebæ, the range of responses, and the determination of effective stimuli, of habit formation, persistency of habits, interference and reinforcement of habits, must be determined and evaluated in and for themselves, regardless of their generality, or of their bearing upon such laws in other forms, if the phenomena of behaviour are ever to be brought within the sphere of scientific control.

This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms.

Psychology as behaviour will, after all, have to neglect but few of the really essential problems with which psychology as an introspective science now concerns itself. In all probability even this residue of problems may be phrased in such a way that refined methods in behaviour (which certainly must come) will lead to their solution.

Some psychologists have contended that the behaviourists approach is as significant for social psychology as for individual psychology. They maintain that it gives a better background from which to estimate the original endowment of man and to interpret the nature of artificial social institutions. Further, it makes the subject one in which observation and measurement is far more feasible. Perhaps no better brief statement of this view has been made than that contained in the following citation from John Dewey :—

The behaviouristic movement transfers attention from vague generalities regarding social consciousness and social mind to the specific processes of interaction which takes place among human beings, and to the details of group-behaviour. It emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the primary activities of human nature, and of the modifications and reorganizations they undergo in association with the activities of others. It radically simplifies the whole problem by making it clear that social institutions and arrangements, including the whole apparatus of tradition and transmission, represent simply the acquired transformations of original human endowments.

This provides the possibility of a positive method for analysing social phenomena. I shall avoid engaging in passing in the disputed question of the value of an introspective psychology. But it seems almost self-evident that even if introspection were a valid method in individual psychology, so called, it could not be of use in the investigation of social facts, even though those facts be labelled social mind or consciousness. Yet one has only to look at the writings of the Austrian and German school of "folk-psychologists" (say of Wundt, obviously the most important) to see how this treatment has been affected by an assumed need of making the methods and results of social psychology conform to the received categories of introspective psychology. From such deforming of facts the behaviouristic outlook immediately redeems us; it represents not an improvement in detail but a different mode of attack. It is not as yet possible to estimate the significance of this alteration. In my opinion, however, the chief cause of the backwardness of social psychology has resided in the artificiality of the endeavour to adapt the rubrics of introspective psychology to the facts of objective associated life. The opening of another road of approach may therefore be expected to emancipate inquiry.¹

1. *Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, pp. 26-28. Cf. "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," in *Psychological Review*, 1913, pp. 158 ff.; and *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Chap. i. Max Meyer has been the other vigorous American exponent of behaviorism. See his *Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior*. Such psychologists as Thorndike, Dewey and Woodworth accept the behavioristic program, but in a more modified and eclectic form than Watson and Meyer.

2. "The Need for Social Psychology," in *Psychological Review*, 1917, pp. 270-71. For an illustration of a restatement of psychological sociology in behavioristic terminology see Professor Giddings' articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, January and March, 1920. In fact, Professor Giddings had taken this position as early as 1903, even before the formulation of the behavioristic position in psychology.

We need not go into the controversy between introspectionists and behaviourists, but the analytical anthropologists, Boas and his disciples, have presented one valid argument against the complete efficacy of the behaviouristic approach. They have demonstrated that mere objective behaviour is not an adequate guide for the interpretation of cultural situations. It is extremely frequent that identity of external behaviour fails utterly to be correlated with similar subjective attitudes in the groups concerned, and it is also often the case that the subjective fact is the most important element in the situation. This is also true in interpreting political psychology. The objective behaviour, for example, of a crowd assembled for political purposes would be much the same whether gathered to hear or praise Harding or Debs, and the behaviour of a crowd assembled for political purposes would not differ materially in its larger characteristics or general pattern of reaction from that of a crowd which had met for economic or religious purposes. It is evident, however, that political activity offers an almost unique field for the behaviouristic method in the objective aspects of the problem, on account of the definite and public method of expressing a considerable portion of political behaviour.

We can make no attempt here to analyse the entry of the statistical method of Quetelet and his successors into social psychology. It has been thoroughly developed by Thorndike and many other experimental psychologists, and has also been extended into sociology. Probably the most energetic exponent of the statistical method in psychological sociology has been Professor Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia University.¹ It is obvious that only by the use of the statistical method can exact measurement of mental and social phenomena be possible, and it is equally clear that the behaviouristic approach is particularly adapted to the entry of the statistical method.

1. Cf. F. H. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*. Professor Giddings has set forth his views in numerous articles. His systematic treatise on statistical sociology is in preparation.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE CIVIC ASSOCIATION.*

THERE has been of late years a somewhat regrettable tendency, or so it seems to some of us, away from concrete thinking to abstractions. It is one form of that German influence on thought which has been so deeply felt during the past two generations, the tendency to metaphysics and metaphysical thinking. So citizenship is taken to mean not a man's or woman's relation to the city or local community in which he lives, but something so vague that it becomes quite indefinite and has nothing to do with anything so concrete as any actual city which forms the environment of our lives.

Just in the same way we talk, not as our forefathers used to do, of the *liberties* that we enjoy, (perhaps I should put this in the past tense), but of a vague abstraction called "liberty" which may mean anything or nothing. So we use the expression "the community" to mean not this actual community of Richmond, but some larger conception covering we don't quite know what. So we replace the old word 'neighbourliness' by the colder and vaguer term philanthropy.

Under these circumstances citizenship comes to mean, if it means anything, voting at parliamentary elections, while local affairs—which are the affairs that very nearly concern all of us—are sneered at as "the politics of the parish pump."

In this address, however, such terms as citizenship and community are taken in the older sense as referring to the actual community in which we live.

But it must be noted the civic life of such a community is by no means limited to the parish pump, *i.e.*, to the provision of pure water and proper drains, important as these are. It is only the depression of the local community arising through the monstrous growth of the Metropolitan area, and cloaked by this metaphysical way of looking at things, which has made such an assumption possible—the assumption, namely, that *civilization* is reserved for the Metropolis! Long ago the Greeks clearly recognized what the city stood for. The town, says Plato in "The Republic," which only provided for material needs would be rightly called Hypopolis—a city of pigs.

The city, says Aristotle, is the place which provides opportunity for the "good life," as distinguished from the village which

* An address to the Civic Association of Richmond, illustrated by lantern slides.

provides for mere existence, or, as we should say, which thinks its interests are limited to the parish pump.

It is convenient to use the term town for such a community, if large enough, and to reserve the name city for a community which has definite organs for that fuller life of which Aristotle speaks.

But in Christian times we must remember that no village is quite without such organs of the higher life and that the difference is merely one of degree.

The rise from the town to the city is to be thought of as a gradual process, a process towards the realization in each place of a local embodiment of the "city of God." This is obviously an intensive rather than an extensive process, not a matter of growth in size so much as of development. Just as in mediæval days any place with a cathedral was reckoned as a city, because the cathedral was the organ of expression of this fuller and higher life, so now we tend to think that a University is the mark of a complete city. But that raises a question as to how far universities include not only provision for learning and science, but for music and art, and all the things that stir and ennable the life of feeling and aspiration.

Coming to detail, we ask how the rise from town to city may be achieved. It involves the growth of interest in the past history, present condition, and future possibilities of the place, such regional studies as those for which the Regional Committee of our Civic Association is now pleading, and planning. To grasp the facts and tendencies of the social life of the community is to irradiate the question of drains, water supply and other "practical" matters by seeing these as the necessary basis without which the rest cannot be developed but not as the be all and end all. For this rise of the civic spirit there is needed beyond the existing activities of the local "temporal power" (the Mayor and Corporation and their officials in the Town Hall), a corresponding kind of "spiritual power" (that is a voluntary and inclusive organisation) which will definitely aim at providing and stimulating the provision of opportunities for a fuller life, at quickening the finer senses and loftier impulses and enlarging, even creating, opportunities for their exercise and outlet. Lay or secular efforts to this end are of course constantly made in various directions in Richmond as elsewhere. Here at Richmond we have, to mention only a few, the W.E.A. actively at work, and we have in addition to the usual lectures and classes, an interesting development of its activities in the musical evenings at Raleigh Road, which I believe are not to be found in other places, though they will probably imitate us in time! We have an operatic society, we have the chamber

concerts initiated through the energy and enterprise of Miss Doris Bates, we have Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Mothers' Unions, we have all sorts and kinds of societies, but it is suggested that if they are brought together into an association, however loose, with each other, and with groups aiming at increasing the pleasantness of Richmond and doing for its outer life something of what these societies do for the inner, they will find many ways of co-operating and they will all fit into place in the general policy of City Development.

It is stimulating to find that Civic Societies are arising independently in some of our great cities, notably at Birmingham, where, of course, the problems are different from ours, and the money resources much greater. As an instance of what the Birmingham Civic Society is doing look at plans made by Professor Adshead at its instance. The Civic Society has been entrusted by the Corporation with making a scheme for the use and development for recreational purposes of over 450 acres of the Lickey Hills, a beautiful upland district near Birmingham, which has been acquired by gift or purchase by the Corporation.

As funds permit parts can be intensively developed in detail, and plans have already been made of this kind for a small recreation centre (slide).

Large gifts have been made by prominent Birmingham citizens towards this recreation area and its development, and towards other open spaces. The Richmond Civic Association appeals for such gifts towards the small playgrounds and gardens needed in crowded areas here. But essential as such things are, I cannot refrain from pointing out that our "Civic Association" is somewhat more inclusive in its aims and methods than the "Birmingham Civic Society" appears to be. Its policy aims at embracing the whole local and cultural environment of the people of Richmond; that is to say, we desire to create a situation in which all of us shall have the opportunity of sharing to the full the social inheritance of our civilization. This means the application of science and art to the physical environment according to their present state of development; in other words, better housing, site planning, provision of small public gardens, play grounds, etc.; on the other hand, it means opportunities for the practice, study and enjoyment of the arts and the sciences.

Such a policy is, it must be admitted, ambitious, but we have the beginnings of it already, although scattered and not deliberately planned. It cannot be fully realized in a moment, "but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a world for," so with a city and even more with a city, since its life continues from one generation to another! It is, we of the Civic Association believe,

the ambitious attempt, the ideal beyond our immediate grasp, which inflames the imagination and rouses the will to an extent undreamed of by the mere so-called "practical" man.

The older tradition, almost forgotten in the Industrial Revolution, is with us here in Richmond and in contrast with the more modern developments of slums, villas and shops, I go on to show a characteristic slide giving something of our civic importance in old Richmond in our beautiful bridge, and some slides showing examples of our unique treasure in Kew Gardens, River and Park.

What a wonderful setting for a city which should shine out from it like a jewel! We can hardly aim too high in Richmond at civic beauty and dignity, if we are to be worthy of this setting!

But the survey map made for the "Beautiful Richmond" Exhibition of 1919 left as part of its legacy a survey map of housing density which very vividly shows at a glance what indeed we all know, that much must be done before Richmond can be worthy of its setting. First, it shows the overcrowding in certain parts and the need for more small gardened spaces and playgrounds. The work of the Association, through its Regional Survey Committee, includes the study of the local environment, beginning with the homes of the people and their surroundings, i.e., the carrying on of a civic survey which this map and other work done in connection with the Richmond Exhibition are the beginning.

Much development in Richmond unfortunately took place at the very nadir of town development, and before the garden city and suburb movement had shown anew that pleasantness need not be sacrificed in the building of towns.

Here is a scene characteristic of part of Richmond, or any other town of the same period. (Slide showing slum houses).

I want to put in contrast a few slides showing this previous type of town development and the garden suburb method, and please note especially the last of these showing the extraordinary success obtained in preventing infant mortality. Health is less easy to measure, but must be assumed to be correspondingly improved. Comparative statistics of height and weight in school children between Bourneville and Birmingham, Port Sunlight and Liverpool bear this out strikingly. (Garden city slides.)

We may note with interest and satisfaction the influence of this movement in the new housing schemes everywhere, and especially here in our new cottages now building off the Sandycombe Road, and their lay-out. But we still need to realize that much can be done in already built districts, even though we cannot at once re-build all slums on these lines, by acquiring small, unbuilt-on spaces and gardening neglected corners, to bring something of

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pleasantness into all parts of the town and make all Richmond as every town should be—a garden city.

The Civic Association, after further careful survey, might well prepare a report on some definite ways in which this might be done. It already possesses a series of photographs of areas requiring improvement and sketches showing possible improvements, that can be carried out at trifling expense and with but slight material readjustments. In the simplest ways of "direct action" between neighbours we could thus go a long way in tidying up and brightening ugly corners. Take the "Vineyard" as it is and might be as an example. (Slides.)

A voluntary guild of garden helpers; the making and handing over for care of certain small gardened playgrounds to particular elementary schools in their vicinity; the introduction of a tree-planting day of annual festivity on which the school children should plant not forest trees, but preferably blossoming trees; are obvious suggestions towards such a report.

To show what may be done by voluntary association in this way let us look at some slides of small gardens made by the "Town and Gown Association" of Edinburgh, and maintained by their voluntary helpers and the children in crowded parts of Edinburgh. The slides show the condition of these places before and after improvement. (Edinburgh slides.) Perhaps you will say we have no such places in Richmond. I show two slides (Richmond) showing places which seem susceptible of improvement out of many others, of which we already have photographs.

Possibly in time some of our existing playgrounds might also be developed, in co-operation with the Town Council, in more imaginative ways, as suggested in the childrens' essays on the subject written for the Richmond Exhibition, and some of them published by the *Richmond Times*. Instead of being hidden behind high walls, as I have said, these might adorn the districts in which they are placed. But essential as all this is, we need more for the full life of our citizens than Richmond as a garden city. Turning to cultural work and enjoyment in Richmond, we at once realize that we are under greater difficulties than in the times of civic magnificence owing to want of public halls. Here we need to recover for modern towns something of the public riches of mediæval times. Then each local trade or craft had its own hall; this slide of the London Stationers' Hall shows one which is comparatively late (17th century), but carrying on the old tradition. So that the very Town Hall itself was thought of as the combined hall of all these guilds, the Guild Hall. (Guild Hall slides.)

I am using London slides, but these guilds and their halls were found in all towns. But we are very short in Richmond of public

halls available for culture purposes. Some day the Civic Association may stir the citizens to build such a hall! Again, beyond the mere hall is needed the Folk House, or civic centre, where numberless activities would be carried on from chamber music to regional survey, and a local museum might be set on foot. One of the larger mansions of the place might be acquired for this purpose, or given by some generous donor.

Another advantage of earlier periods was that the dress of the people was such that it lent itself easily to pageantry, processions and plays (slide showing London procession), and the architecture was worthy of the dresses. Even the peasants in old days had splendid dresses for feast days, much more the townsmen. (Slide of peasants.)

Now if we built a splendid city we should disfigure it by walking about in it! I venture to suggest that an important and necessary part in the recovery of the city from its long depression will be a change in the dress of the citizens (Slides comparing mediaeval and modern dress.) But before this can come we need a change in mentality from the gloom and depression of the town in the period of the Industrial Revolution to the expression of the joy of life—showing itself in creative activity, in art, in music, in drama—of the new city, which is the old city recovering from its long sleep.

It is not enough to see, as we see to-day, a mere breakdown of the Puritanism with which the people consoled themselves when the Renaissance gentlemen looted the cities and their churches to adorn their country houses. That breakdown may constitute a great danger if we fail to find expression on the higher levels of life for the life-energies of the people, no longer repressed.

The culture city is a city of men and women who are craftsmen, musicians and artists, thinkers and poets, dramatists and psychologists, sociologists and students, like not only Athens or Florence, but such smaller cities as Perugia and Siena in the days of their glory.

The Civic Association therefore attempts to unite all who are endeavouring to find outlets for these activities and to develop them.

Its survey should include not only a geographic and typographic survey of *place*, and an economic survey of *work*, but also a sociological survey of *folk* and their activities, and, based on this, its policy should be the development of all cultural and health-giving opportunities and of education towards their sharing and enjoyment.

Such cultural activities range from dancing on the green to writing a poem; from acting a play or taking part in a pageant, to composing an opera.

The increased leisure which shorter hours of work bring to all classes combines with the breakdown of Puritanism to make the development of such activities among all classes not only possible but urgent to-day. It is for our Civic Association to appeal for support to all the inhabitants of Richmond in thinking out and adopting the necessary steps towards this gradual realization of the city in the town.

Such a union of individuals and associations, with such an end, if it meets with success here, will, we may hope, be reproduced elsewhere, and Richmond, as it was years ago a pioneer in housing, become a pioneer in city-building.

SYBELLA BRANFORD.

CURRENT PERIODICALS.

KÖLNER VIERTELJAHRSHEFT FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN. Vol. i, Part 1, published by Duncker and Humblot, Munich and Leipzig.

The publication in Cologne of this Quarterly Journal of Social Science is an event of some importance, embodying as it does the work and some of the provisional results of the Institute for Research in Social Science inaugurated at Cologne in April 1919. The aims and scope of this Institute form the subject of the article by Dr. Christian Eckert, its first director, and professor of Political Science in the University of Cologne. He explains the relation in which the Institute stands to the University, that of an independent body putting its organization at the service of the University in so far as is compatible with its own plans of work. Dr. Leopold von Wiese, director of the Sociological section, gives a sketch of the plan of work to be undertaken by a German sociological review. He recounts an attempt at a survey or collection of information from the institutions of higher education in Germany as to the academic status of social science. The results are tabulated in the Journal (pp. 86—90), but Dr. von Wiese considers them disappointing as there is little evidence of any underlying coherent plan or of co-operation. "It almost seems," he says, "as though every one had come to the conclusion—'Let us take no more heed of this sparring and cock-fighting about methods; let each of us go his own way!'" This state of affairs, he thinks, can be remedied by the gradual establishing of a body of opinion through organized research and discussion. The article explains a scheme for exchange of sociological literature and other material with other countries.

A short historical sketch of the progress of the German Sociological Society founded in 1909 in Berlin is contributed by Ferdinand Tönnies, whose methodological work in sociology is well known.

Of much interest, too, is an article by Alfred Vierkandt touching on the problem of the relations of the individual psyche to the collective life. The interconnection between psychology and social science are also discussed by Prof. von Wiese in the supplementary article (intended to form part of a special volume) on the methodology of the study of relations, and it is clear that as with us the ground in this subject is only just being broken.

The Journal contains a valuable and concise review, under the heading "Chronik" of the recent progress of sociology in this country, in the United States of America, and in Germany.

C.J.M.H.

THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1920-21.

The last Annual Report of the Sociological Society (published in the *Sociological Review*, October, 1920), included an account of the Society's work after its removal from the London School of Economics to Leplay House, and up to the last Annual General Meeting in July, 1920. Since this date the Society has been active in the organization of Groups for study and research on special subjects, and of meetings and lectures of general interest.

During the past year the following meetings have been held :—

AUTUMN TERM.

October 25. Symposium : " Impressions of the New Germany." Chairman, Mr. A. G. Gardiner.

Mr. Raymond Unwin spoke of his impressions during a recent visit to Germany, and papers from Mr. Huntly Carter, Dr. Marcel Hardy and Mr. W. Mann were read.

November 9th. " Theology and Sociology." Mrs. Victor Branford. Chairman, Mr. S. H. Swinny.

November 23rd. " Suggestions towards a Science of Corporate Life." Mr. C. R. Enoch. Chairman : Sir Francis Younghusband.

December 7th. " The Mechanism of Consumer Control." Major Douglas. Chairman, Mr. J. A. Hobson.

LENT TERM.

Jan. 25th. " The Prospects of Parliamentary Government." Mr. H. J. Laski. Chairman, Prof. Graham Wallas.

March 1st. " Sociology and Progress." Mr. H. C. Dawson. Chairman, Mr. Farquharson.

March 10th. " The Hebrew University in Jerusalem." Mr. Leon Simon. Chairman, Mr. Victor Branford.

SUMMER TERM.

Joint Meeting with the S.E. Union of Scientific Societies, and the Regional Association.

April 2nd. " The Saffron Walden Survey." Mr. George Morris. Chairman, Professor Boulger.

Joint Meetings with the Regional Association :—

May 12th. " Co-operation in Social Studies." Professor Patrick Geddes. Chairman, Principal Ernest Barker.

June 2nd. " The Municipal Survey of Sheffield." Professor Abercrombie. Chairman, Professor Adshead.

The last meeting of the Summer Term was held on June 14th, at the Rooms of the Royal Society, when the Hon. Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri spoke on the Non-Co-operation Movement in India, with Mr. Edwyn Bevan in the Chair.

The papers given on January 25th by Mr. Laski, and on June 14th by the Hon. Mr. Sastri, were part of a series on Present Day Political Developments, which it is hoped to continue in the autumn.

STUDY AND RESEARCH GROUPS.

Three Groups were organized during the past year for special study :—

- (1) *La Science Sociale Group*, for the study and translation of the works of the school of French sociologists known by that name, beginning with Mons. E. Demolins' book, "Comment la Route crée le Type Social." The translation of the first volume of this work is now completed, and a beginning has been made with the second volume. It is hoped that when both volumes are translated and revised it may be possible to publish the work with an introduction, indicating the scientific developments which have taken place since its first publication.
- (2) *Rural Development Group*. This Group held fortnightly meetings during the winter and spring terms, at several of which speakers representing organizations in rural areas addressed the Group on the special rural problems with which their organizations are dealing.

In view of the fact that several members of the Group were to be out of London during the summer, it was decided to postpone further meetings of the Group until the autumn.

- (3) *Social Psychology Group*. This Group, which was the last to be formed, held its first meeting on November 30th 1920. At subsequent meetings a series of papers were given to the Group by Mr. Victor Branford, followed by papers from Mr. Swinny, Mr. Gould, Mr. Morris Ginsberg, and Miss Bodkin.

Miss Robinson acted as Group Secretary up to the end of the Easter Term, when she was obliged to resign for family reasons. An Executive Committee was then formed to organize the work of the Group. This Committee consists of : Dr. William Brown (Chairman), Mr. F. M. H. Holman (Vice-Chairman), Dr. Hudson (Organizing Secretary), Mrs. Fraser Davies (Secretary), Mr. Farquharson, Mr. Morris Ginsberg, Miss G. Mayer, Colonel Rows, Mr. Shand, Miss Tatton, Prof. Westermarck. The functions of this Committee will be to arrange the courses of study, select the lectures when necessary, recommend the available literature on the subjects under consideration, circulate amongst the members a *précis* of the substance of the work completed at each meeting, and generally endeavour to maintain the studies at the highest degree of efficiency.

It is also intended to form a library of the literature dealing with the subject under study, for the use of the members of the Group.

Certain members have already volunteered to engage in research work. Every encouragement will be offered to members able and willing to devote their spare time to this branch of study.

The subject selected for the first course of study is "The Family."

The inaugural address of the present course of study was given by Professor Westermarck on May 11th the subject being "The Primitive Family."

SPECIAL LECTURES.

It was decided to take advantage of Professor Patrick Geddes' presence in London this summer, by arranging that he should give a course of lectures on Civics and Sociology at Leplay House during May and the early part of June. A further short course of lectures, jointly with the Guild of Education as National Service, was given by Professor Geddes at 11, Tavistock Square in July, on "Education in its widest aspects, and at its various levels."

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

A Co-operative Society, under the title of Sociological Publications, Ltd., has now been registered, to publish the *Sociological Review*, and possibly other matter. In order to ensure close co-operation between the Council and the new Society, it has been arranged that the Chairman of Council shall be *ex-officio* Chairman of Sociological Publications, Ltd., and that copies of the *Review* shall be supplied to members of the Sociological Society as before.

MEMBERSHIP.

The total number of members and associates now on the books of the Society is 314. Of these, 27 members and 12 associates have joined during the period under review. The Council regret to record the death of three members of the Society during the past twelve months, among these being Captain Osman Newland, who had for so many years done valuable work upon the Council of the Society. The Council has to tender its thanks to Mrs. Newland for the generous gift of several of the late Captain Newland's books to its Library.

COUNCIL.

The Council has held four meetings in the course of the year.

During the summer it became necessary for Mr. Victor Branford, the Chairman of Council, to undergo a serious operation which has obliged him to lay aside all work for several months. It is pleasant to record that the operation has been successful, and it is expected that Mr. Branford's health will permit him to return to active work before very long.

During Mr. Branford's absence Mr. Farquharson has acted as Deputy Chairman of Council.

LEPLAY HOUSE.

A reference was made in the last Annual Report to the generosity of two members of Council which had enabled the Society to move from the London School of Economics to quarters of its own in Leplay House. An arrangement has now been made, in accordance with proposals put before the Council, with regard to the administration of the business affairs of Leplay House by a Trust. It is hoped by the Trustees that, as the membership of the Society increases, it will be possible to devote to its use the rooms at present occupied by other bodies.

During the past year the Society has derived much benefit from the possession of offices of its own in which meetings can be held, and also of a Library which is at the disposal of members and associates. Arrangements have been made for the union of this Library with that of the Civic Education League, and a Joint Hon. Librarian has been appointed. The Council are anxious that this Library should be improved and increased to meet the demands of readers, of whom there are already a considerable (and a growing) number. Gifts either of money to buy books, or of books, will be gladly received by the Society.

That the activities above indicated will be extended during the coming year, and that work of real sociological value will be done under the auspices of the Society, is the belief and hope of the Council. But this work is greatly hampered by lack of funds. The Council therefore trusts that all members and associates of the Society will give their continued assistance during the coming year. A larger membership should naturally result from the increased activity of the Society, as shown in this Report, and members are urged both to co-operate actively in the work of the Society and to interest others in it. The Council would thus be enabled to carry on its task, more necessary than ever at the present time, of promoting investigation and research, and advancing education, in the social sciences.

CONFERENCE OF THE SCOTTISH REGIONAL ASSOCIATION.

At this conference at the Outlook Tower, Edinburgh, from 4th to 9th April, a main feature was the surveying by the students of an actual area, viz., the mouth of the Esk. The existing Edinburgh Survey was on view during the week as well as Surveys of Deeside, Aberdeen (Aberdeen Regional Association), Leuchars (Dr. I. B. Mears), and the Island of Foula in Shetland (Mrs. Stoughton Holborn). Preliminary demonstrations on the general principles of regional survey with special reference to the Edinburgh and Esk-mouth area were followed by lectures on the Natural History Sciences, the Agricultural Sciences, and Civics. Dr. James Ritchie, of the Royal Scottish Museum (a former student of Prof. J. Arthur Thomson) dealt with "Regionalism in Natural History" (that is, with Ecology). He illustrated from animal life the fundamental solidarity between organism and environment which is the root-principle of both the Ecological and the Regionalist outlook. Dr. W. G. Smith, of the College of Agriculture, carried forward the principle into the Agricultural Sciences. He described the natural features of the country district of East Lothian, adjoining the Esk, traced the relationships between its natural and economic flora and fauna and touched upon the resultant ways of life of the country people.

East Lothian rises in a series of zones from the coast about Dunbar to the grassy tops of the Lammermuir Hills, and includes various kinds of farming and stock-raising, with their corresponding forms of human culture.

Mr. Frank C. Mears linked up country and town life, with special reference to the conditions in Mediaeval Edinburgh. He showed that in the early 12th century each burgess farmed a definite allotment, which was attached to his house. There was thus at this period no divorce between town and country.

The general principle of this necessary three-fold relationship (of Nature, Agriculture and Burghal life) having been established, attention was next directed to the main periods in the history of the region. Before the coming of the Romans there would appear to have been a flourishing settlement in the area stretching from the fertile lower Esk valley up towards Duddingston and the eastern slopes of Arthur Seat (as show, for example, by the abundant traces of cultivation-terraces on the latter hill).

The Conference visited the site of the Roman headquarters at Inveresk and, under the leadership of Mr. James Wilkie, S.S.C. (author of "Historic Musselburgh"), inspected the remains, such as building-stones and portions of the *thermæ*, which suggest that a large field of work waits the excavator in the area. Attention was given to the course of the Roman road called Dere Street, which, starting from Newstead on the Tweed, proceeded up Lauderdale and past Soutra, after which it probably divided into branches to the mouths of the Water of Leith (via Dalkeith) and of the Esk respectively. A coast road linked up these river mouths with that of the River Almond, thereafter proceeding westward to join the Antonine wall near Grangemouth. At the point where this crossed a burn between Inveresk and Leith a highly important discovery was made by the Conference students on one of their afternoon excursions. This was nothing less than the hitherto unrecorded abutments of a Roman bridge.

The Roman Fort, on a sea-side bluff at Inveresk, commanded an extensive view and afforded the garrison easy access to the sea. Edinburgh Castle Rock itself does not seem to have been occupied by the Romans, surrounded as it was by forest, bog, and barren hill.

Dr. W. B. Blaikie lectured upon the period which immediately followed the Roman withdrawal from North Britain. The resistance of the Romanized Britons to the Barbarian raiders (Picts and Scots, Angles, Saxons, and Frisians) is symbolized by

King Arthur, apparently a British chieftain of the 5th Century. It is during the period of invasions by sea that Edinburgh Castle appears to have risen into importance; the combination of seaport with a fortress three or four miles inland is common in this neighbourhood (thus Leith—Edinburgh, Inverkeithing—Dunfermline, Innerleven—Kannoway, Tynningham—Traprain). These fortresses were no doubt designed as refuges for the natives of the coast, just far enough inland to dissuade pirates from leaving their boats in order to reach them.

The emergence of Edinburgh may thus be reckoned as part of the Arthurian movement in this region. Dr. Blaikie produced good reasons for the belief that some, if not all, of Arthur's famous twelve battles with the barbarians were fought in the region of the Antonine Wall, *i.e.*, at the northernmost confines of Romanized Britain; the names attributed to certain of these battles, as, *e.g.*, Douglas, Wedale, and Mynedd-Agred, are highly suggestive, the last being actually the Brythonic name for Edinburgh.

As already stated, Mr. Mears lectured upon the later stages in the history of the Scottish capital, and notably upon the creation of the Royal Burgh by King David I in the 12th Century. The present High Street was in its original form laid out *en bloc* as an entirely new town, there being a noble central space upon the crest of the ridge and the houses which surrounded it being each provided with a small holding which stretched laterally down the slope. It was owing to the later Wars of Independence that the original spacious lay-out of the old town became obscured; the necessities of defence confined the town within its wall; hence arose the lofty tenements or "lands," and building-encroachments blotted out the crofts. Thus was lost that definite rural element of mediæval Edinburgh which has never since been regained. Mr. Mears also showed how the classical plan of the new town of the end of the 18th century broke down in large degree. He strongly urged the necessity for comprehensiveness of outlook (both in time and space) in all future town-planning schemes, as also for the need of recognizing not merely the "bricks and mortar," but also the varied human population both in their homes and at their work.

Dr. A. J. Brock dealt with the remarkable development of Regional Survey (so-called *Hembygds-forsknings*) in the Scandinavian and Baltic lands (Norway, Sweden and Finland). Each of these countries has a central institute for regionalism in its capital, with extensive ramifications into the remotest parts of the country. All classes of the population are employed in collecting material.

Among the observations made on the field-excursions was the importance of the geographical factor in war as in peace—thus the edge of the southern uplands (the Tranent-Gladsmuir ridge) played a notable part in battles fought close to Inveresk, *e.g.*, those of Pinkie and Prestonpans.

One morning was devoted to a discussion on the Relation of the Regionalistic idea to Education. Among others who spoke were Miss Mary Ritchie (Education Department, Natal), Miss Margaret Drummond (Provincial Training College, Edinburgh), and Miss Cowan (Edinburgh Education Authority). Emphasis was laid on the special value of regionalistic teaching in relation to the seminar work which is beginning to take the place of ordinary class teaching in the newer schools.

At the final meeting of the Conference there was a discussion on the relation of Regionalism to National and International Movements such as Home Rule and the League of Nations. Miss Jean Lambie spoke for Scottish Home Rule, Mrs. Rees for the League. There was considerable agreement as to the dangers of centralization, national as well as imperial, and the need of the people finding some more direct method than parliamentarism for the expression of their will. The point of view of Regionalism would appear to be that Direct Action of the right sort can only be properly expressed in and through the place where one lives and works.

REVIEWS.

THE RATIONAL GOOD: A Study in the Logic of Practice. By L. T. Hobhouse, D.Lit., LL.D., Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. George Allen and Unwin, 1921.

This book, we are told in the preface, has been on its way some 10 or 12 years. It is all the more welcome now that it has come. No one has a good word in these days for hedonism, but in view of recent developments in the psychology of feeling and instinct, a restatement of ethical theory in full view of them is somewhat overdue. Professor Hobhouse's book may be said to be an attempt to reconcile the older rationalism with the new irrationalism or (to give it a less question-begging name) the new instinctivism. On the one hand, he insists that reason or conscious purpose "emerges from needs lying below the threshold, and is powerless without the force of impulse behind it." On the other hand, he holds that there is always a principle at work fitting particular impulses into a larger scheme, modifying and even suppressing them in the interest of some wider whole. Nothing could be better than his statement of this point on p. 30. He hesitates indeed to say, with some idealists, that man's reason may put new objects before him, but he sees clearly and expresses with admirable lucidity, the power of reason to convert passing impulses into elements in a more permanent, more comprehensive, purpose. On a line with this is his definition in the chapter on "Impulse and Control" of the will as the continuous direction on an object which brings unity into volitions or (by a useful distinction) *acts* of will. At the same time he warns us (again I think usefully) that "to identify the will with the unity of the self in its conational aspect is not to make the self the object of the will. The objects of the will, the principles that guide it, are those which interest the self, and these are not (for the normal being) the self again."

In the central chapter in "The Rational Good," we are still on what is more or less familiar and, I think, indisputable ground. Starting from the unity of the reason in all it exercises, Professor Hobhouse maintains that "here, as in theory, we shall look to inter-connexion as itself the rational principle." "The rational good forms a connected whole in which no part is isolated." In conformity with this, practical reason is defined as "the effort of the mind towards harmony with itself and with nature," a harmony which it is finely said "the mind does not find but creates, or rather, let us say, that it finds in dying cadence and catches, of which it seeks to make a music." All this, together with the definitions of "duty and right," which follow, is excellently lucid, and, I think, convincing.

It is an ungrateful task to turn from these agreements to criticism. But as we have seen, the significance of the book lies in its being an attempt to do justice to the element of feeling in conduct, and the reviewer is bound to look narrowly at it in this aspect. And here I have to confess a certain degree of disappointment. One should at least expect some precise definition of feeling. Instead of this the word is broadened out till it may seem almost anything. It is that on which "impulse turns"; an element in a complex called "impulse-feeling"; "the whole psychosis corresponding to a physical action"; that which not only disposes to action but expresses itself in judgment"; finally, by a kind of apotheosis, it is identified with the practical reason itself which is defined as "the mass of impulse-feelings harmonized." (Would the writer define the theoretic reason as the mass of cognitive feelings harmonized?) What we miss here is any clear recognition of the distinction (1) between the

conational and the affective elements in the complex impulse-feeling (Dr. McDougall's account of this is well known), and (2) between the felt-impulse (impulse-feeling ?) and the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that follows upon action (achievement-feeling ?). In the absence of such an analysis it is difficult to escape the suspicion that the writer confuses two fundamentally different questions, the one psychological, the other ethical. We may agree that nothing can be good which does not appeal to some need, disposition or impulse, and that, feeling being the name for the appealingness of it, we are justified in calling good any experience which is in harmony with impulse-feeling in the sense of felt-impulse. Further, we may agree that the supreme good must consist in the harmonious satisfaction of all needs—in other words, in a completely harmonious experience. But to say this is one thing, to say that the ethical standard is harmonious feeling is quite another. Harmony, wherever it occurs, has a feeling side not only accompanying but as the writer, following Aristotle, maintains, reacting upon the harmony, sustaining, "perfecting" it. But is it not the character of the harmony which the act expresses (the fact that it is harmony with "the permanent scheme of vital fulfilment," as the writer expresses it) that gives moral quality to the feeling and not *vice versa*? The ambiguity referred to is illustrated in the very interesting passage in which the writer criticises T. H. Green, and in which the position that the good is nothing if it does not appeal to feeling, seems to be taken as equivalent to the very different proposition that "feeling holds the reins." Green was Platonist enough (see *Philebus* 21) to accept the former; he was too good a Platonist to accept the latter. The further criticism of the formula of self-realisation on the ground that it fails to justify self-sacrifice raises a deeper question. The writer's own vindication of it seems to rest on the temporary imperfections of a social order that require it in the individual, instead of, as Green held, on the very nature of human (perhaps also of divine) life as a dying to live. Which view gives the greater reality to self-sacrifice the reader may judge.

I have left no space to deal with the extremely interesting section of the chapter on "Implications," in which Professor Hobhouse brings the ethical theory here sketched into relation with what he has elsewhere written on the theory of Development and Purpose, and raises the questions of the scope and power, and of the concrete embodiment, or real being of "the principle making for harmony" that underlies both. On the latter of these two questions I think he will have the majority of his readers with him in leaving the question of the form of unity of Mind which seems implied by both theories, and with it that of personality, an open one, and in the view that "there is no abysmal conflict between ethics and evolution" seeing that the flower of the evolutionary process is the ethical spirit.

I have laid stress in this review upon points of disagreement, but these do not lessen my admiration for the freshness and the brilliance of the writer's treatment of the main ethical problem and particularly for the subtlety of insight which he brings to the analysis of the moral consciousness.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF CORRECT THINKING.

* "A New System of Scientific Procedure," by G. Spiller, author of "The Mind of Man," etc. London, Watts and Co., 17, Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, E.C.

Mr. Spiller has written a treatise* which aims at a modern re-statement of Bacon's endeavour towards a "science of correct thinking." In his opening passage Mr. Spiller cites Whewell's assertion that "an art of discovery is impossible"; and puts against it as an instance of the opposite extreme, Macaulay's saying that "all men instinctively practice this art." On the final page of his work Mr. Spiller returns to Bacon and recalls this sentence from the *Novum Organum*: "The course which I

propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but little to the acuteness and strength of wits but places all wits and understanding nearly on a level." Between this claim and Professor Fowler's negation of it "Bacon's promise never has been and never can be fulfilled," Mr. Spiller's own position is intermediate. He has surveyed the whole field of methodology, past, present and prospective, in an encyclopaedic treatise of 450 closely printed pages, approximating in all to 250,000 words. A great multiplicity of concrete examples and historic illustrations, running pervasively throughout the work, relieves any strain there may be in following the abstract presentation and makes the book a readable one even for those not specially interested in methodological problems.

Though not quite the basis of the author's arrangement, yet the book may be perhaps most conveniently handled in a brief notice by thinking of it as consisting of three parts. The first is an analysis, appreciation and criticism of previous writers from Bacon onwards. Here is presented and estimated the recent Tradition of Methodology; the earlier, or pre-Baconian sources being less fully explored. Next there is a critical survey of existing modes and instruments of observation, research and thought, as actually employed not only in current science, but also in every-day usage. And finally, the larger part of the treatise is given to a systematic presentation of the improved methodology for scientific and common use which the author has built on the foundations of Tradition, Theory and Practice.

For a sample of Mr. Spiller's treatment of current practice in the social sciences, the following passage may be cited. His complaint is that in this field, scientific method is to a large extent conspicuous by its absence. "The writer on ethics, for example, is as a rule unperturbed either in regard to making sure of his facts or as to verifying his conclusions, unless indeed fugitive and haphazard attention to these is to be honoured by such a name. He generalizes, he deduces, he speculates, he affirms and denies, irrespective of a stern and synthetic rule. No wonder, therefore, that ethical systems are almost as plentiful as blackberry bushes in the country. Anyone with an exuberant imagination, well read in general, who has acquainted himself with the airy speculations of the past, can possess his own ethical universe of thought."

"If we turn to psychology, we are on a relatively higher plane, since much is made here of facts; but rigorous method is also in this instance deplorably lacking, witness the almost universal acceptance of commonplaces—which are the bane of science—relating to the nature of the sensations, attention, habit, memory, imagination, ratiocination, pleasure and pain, emotions, will, and touching almost everything else in psychology. No wonder that Herbart, Thomas Brown and James Mill, who wrote about a century ago, are scarcely out of date, except perhaps for part of their plain terminology."

"In sociology abundant and invaluable detail work has been performed, but if we reflect that one may almost say, 'as many sociologists, so many sociological systems,' one feels that here also too much freedom is given to the speculative fancy."

"In short, over extensive tracts of modern thought, no true scientific spirit broods. Unjustified generalizations and deductions abound, methodical observation and verification are neglected, subtlety in argument is prized, traditions, conventions and prejudices are revered, affirmative instances disposed of by ingenious arguments, and were it not that our well-informed age has collected many facts exacting a minimum of allusions to reality, we could not be said in diverse departments to be far removed from pre-Baconian days."

"Let us submit some examples in illustration. In recent years the theory has become increasingly popular that the human species, like animal species, is primarily determined in its conduct by instincts, *pace* the works of Kirkpatrick, McDougall, Ellwood, and others. At last we are supposed to have struck the bed-rock fact in

psychology, sociology and ethics. Yet extreme vagueness is noticeable regarding the signification of the term Instinct. Sometimes it is conceived as an impulse; sometimes as an inherited functional arrangement by which impulses are gratified; sometimes it is confounded with the total hereditary outfit; and its distinct relation to automatic and reflex action on the one hand, and habit and deliberate thought on the other, is confidently commented on. That is, a popular conception, misty in the highest degree, is proposed as the basis of a number of sciences."

"The kindred problem of heredity and culture is in the same predicament. Scores of works, dealing directly or indirectly with heredity, assert emphatically that just as the activities of animals are determined primarily by congenital capacities, so are those of human beings. In whatever walk of life therefore men or women are superior to their fellows, they have, it is contended, to ascribe their superiority mainly to their native outfit. Education has assigned to it a certain value, but a quite subsidiary one. Yet methodologically this constitutes again an impossible attitude. Why not learn what primitive peoples can and do achieve at school and at college—economic, scholastic, and other surrounding conditions being approximately equal? Why not observe cases of the adoption of new-born infants where family circumstances have been radically altered? Or, as a matter of fact, why not pursue the recognised experimental method, adopting children of different peoples and social layers from birth, and giving each as nearly as possible the very same and the very best education and upbringing? Why not? Because our age is as yet mostly unconscious of the need of procedure being determined methodologically, and is too frequently content to pronounce magisterially, on matters for which it has no verified evidence."

The above extracts are fair samples from page upon page of Mr. Spiller's critical treatment; to select correspondingly representative illustrations from his still more numerous pages of constructive treatment is difficult, partly no doubt because of the condensed character of the matter. Less difficult is it to describe the spirit of the book as a whole. Throughout there is conspicuous an effort to contrive a discipline both mental and moral, whereby the man of science and the plain man alike may acquire those habits of fact which constitute Accuracy and those habits of thought which some call Lucidity and others Reason. It is doubtless with this double end in view that the author throughout the text oscillates between the indicative of science and the imperative of morals. The analysis of exposition is balanced by the implied synthesis of hortative passages. For a simpler sort of example of the latter take the following set of injunctions relating to self-training in method:—

"(a) Follow precedent, follow the best precedents; (b) follow example, follow the best examples; (c) learn by the experience of others, learn by your own experience; (d) inquire of, and consult with, others; (e) profit by what is revealed by accident or special circumstances; (f) learn through appropriate, and increasingly profounder, reading and study; (g) learn through frequently, and sometimes systematically reflecting over work, its minor and major problems, with a view to its improvement; (h) experiment both on a limited and on an extensive scale; (i) Seek to improve on, and generalize as widely as possible, what you have learnt through precedent, example, experience, enquiry and consultation, accident and special circumstances, reading and study, frequent and also systematic reflection, and experiment; and (j) continue all your life improving methods and products by above and by other means."

The only serious omission we notice from this encyclopædic, scholarly and systematic treatise, is one for which not the author but the trend of modern philosophy and science is responsible. It is the failure he shares with the representative masters of logic, of not examining the methodic resources of the occult and mystical tradition with a view to sift and incorporate what may be available therefrom, for general use. The essence of that method would appear to be a very deliberate selection of mental

imagery and a training of the mind to hold these images at will in the focus of attention against all the distractions that tend to put our stream of conscious thought outside personal control. The aim seemingly is by sinking this conscious imagery into what nowadays is called the sub-conscious mind, thereby to evoke from latency to actuality, and then to give specific direction to, those creative powers of the inner life which form character and generate personality. In the latent forces of visual imagery, purposely selected and habitually cultivated, perhaps reside no small part of the mystery of genius in science as well as in art, literature and religion. If so it is for the methodologist a central issue to explicate the conditions of its optimum use and development. And it is surely here that something is to be learned from the immemorial tradition of occult speculation and mystical practice directed to this particular type of discipline at once mental and moral and therefore in a sense "religious." That this tradition is still a living one seeking a closer adaptation to modern needs and current conditions of life may be seen in the popular presentation of Evelyn Underhill's *Practical Mysticism*, and the masterly one of A.E.'s *Candle of Vision*. If Mr. Spiller's book gives rise, as it is well calculated to do, to a general renewal of interest in those methodological problems which of late have fallen into abeyance, then further editions will doubtless be called for and the hope may be expressed that immense as is his field of thought and research he might yet see his way to widen its scope in the above sense.

SOCIOLOGY: Its Development and Application. By J. Q. Dealey. 548 pp. 8vo. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1920.

This is a voluminous volume: the revision of a similar treatise of 1909. I have been puzzled to think out why I dislike it, for I do most definitely object: I found it difficult to read—and wearisome in the extreme. I put it down ten days ago, and have come back to it again with renewed distaste. What is the matter? As the author says, he offers "a comprehensive statement": on any and every aspect of sociology? It is good of him to be so industrious and take such immense trouble to make statements: why not thank him for his industry and ask him to go forward and compile more statements?

No, that is exactly what we must not do. This volume is not a book at all; it is a "text-book for college use," a cyclopaedia of facts disguised under the form of chapters of a real book. There appear to be an immense number of college students reading sociology in America, and Professor Dealey gives them just what they are supposed to want in order that they may complete a "course" and qualify. The same thing is done by other professors for every conceivable subject of academic study; why not do it for sociology? Personally I doubt whether even algebra can be adequately absorbed by reading a dull text-book; but there can be no doubt that sociology is simply killed under such treatment. He does not anticipate that many of the "topics" or "aspects" which he expounds will arouse interest, but if they do he supplies a few references, so that the students can go on studying sociology if he pleases. One feature of this weary academic attitude is the complacent belief of the author that he and his students are doing something really important. "Sociological teachings have already powerfully affected the world's point of view and are rapidly socializing its politics." "Sociology realizes that evolution is better than revolution, that haste must be made slowly, and that it is no easy task to quicken the leaden feet of Nature." "Which nobody can deny," as the old song has it.

Professor Dealey has got on the wrong track; he must frankly own up that he has nothing to say:—whereupon we add that he does not say it well. Let us hasten to add also that our condemnation of this book does not arise in the least from

prejudice against things American; on the contrary, we know that there are quite a number of sociologists in America who are doing original work; we know also that many English professors write "text books for colleges," when they should be using their brains to better purpose. Our protest is on behalf of sociology, which in Europe, at any rate, still finds itself very coldly welcomed in the seats of learning.

F.

THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.

LE LOTTA PER L'ESISTENZA E I SUOI EFFETTI NELL' UMANITÀ. By M. Angelo Vaccaro. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1921. Lire 20.

Signor Vaccaro, the eminent Italian sociologist, in issuing a fifth edition of his work on the struggle for existence, has added two new and important chapters, the one dealing with the world war, and the other with Bolshevism and the Russian Revolution. The former, indeed, often reads more like a party pamphlet than a sociological study, and contains a general attack on the policy of the Allies, or at least of England and France. It is, however, a refreshing change to find that England now takes the position of the chief villain of the piece, generally reserved in this country for France. In fact, the chief sins of France appear to be that she is so unreasonable as to expect Germany, herself unravaged, to pay for the devastations wrought on French soil and that an insufficient sum is allotted to pay for the devastations in Italy—complaints which seem not quite consistent. On the other hand, in his chapter on Bolshevism, Signor Vaccaro, writing as a moderate and evolutionary socialist, does not forget that he is a sociologist. His account of the relation between the thought of Marx and the action of Lenin, with its accentuation of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is very well done, as is his epitome of the general inconsistency of the Bolshevik position. Lenin wrote, after the revolution of 1905, that neither the economic development which is the objective condition, nor the enlightenment and organization of the workers, the subjective condition, were such in Russia as to permit the complete and immediate liberation of the proletariat. Yet, though these conditions remained unfulfilled, he has now attempted this immediate and complete revolution.

As regards the main subject of the work, Vaccaro takes up the true sociological position. Societies exist in a world subject to physical and to biological laws, and therefore to trace social development we must take those laws—and not least the Darwinian struggle for existence—into account. But sociological are not mere corollaries or applications of biological laws, the former cannot be deduced from the latter. The laws of social existence and development must rest on inductions from social facts, and not on deductions from even the widest laws of Biology. Moreover, in man, natural selection takes a different course to that followed amongst the other animals. Man has the power of *social transmission*, and he transmits his tools, not as an inseparable part of his body, like the inherited organs of the beasts, but as something separate, which can become the property, not only of his descendants according to the flesh, but of all the children of men. Natural selection in man consists not so much in the destruction of bad stock, as in the improvement of instruments. In one way only does natural selection act alike among men and beasts, and that is in the pressure of numbers on the supply of food. But even this, it would seem, re-enters into the case of the dominant effect of the improvement of instruments, if we take the term in the largest sense; for the increase of science and its application to agriculture, may result in the supply of food increasing even more quickly than the population.

The author has no difficulty in showing that so far as biological survival is

concerned, many previous states of civilization have not favoured the survival of the fittest—that often when, e.g., one race has imposed itself by conquest on another, both have deteriorated, the conquered forced to a lower level by their sufferings, while the conquerors become parasitic on their subject labour. But in proving this, Vaccaro deems it necessary to show that nearly all bygone systems have been terribly oppressive, and that nearly all rulers have been tyrants, until it becomes a marvel that the human race has survived. And all this is set forth with a violence of denunciation which we are more accustomed to in revolutionists denouncing present evils than in the treatment of civilizations which prevailed and disappeared centuries ago. Neither the systems, impugned, nor even the human race itself could have survived such a prolonged ordeal. The thesis is supported by some very dubious history. It is assumed that Carthage as a trading city must of necessity have had a higher civilization than Rome. What proof is there of this in the facts? In his careful study of the trading civilizations, Demolins (*Comment la route crée le type social*, I, pp. 317–380) shows that such purely commercial civilizations are at once unstable and tyrannical, both at home and abroad. Again, while taking a view of the middle ages which accentuates the bad and ignores the good qualities of the Catholic-Feudal period, Vaccaro actually assumes that because morals were lax under the Renaissance, they must have been still more lax in mediaeval times, thus ignoring the effects of the discredit into which the old institutions and the old morality had fallen, replaced only by an eager intellectual curiosity and artistic enthusiasm, which left the greater part of life without order and without moral restraint. To take one more instance, there is much ground for believing that the wars and reverses of Louis XIV's reign seriously affected the prosperity of France. But on the whole, after 1715, the century seemed to be one of slow recovery. At all events, the peasants kept on buying land (and the peasants were the majority of the nation), and when the opportunity came at the Revolution to make purchases on very favourable terms, the money was not wanting. Is this a sign of continual impoverishment? No doubt, under the *Ancien Régime* the peasant had good reason to conceal his wealth, and this may have led observers astray. Arthur Young was inclined to compare the French with the English farmer, but the smaller farmers in France occupied a place in the social scale between the English farmer and the landless labourer—below the one, much above the other. But the most serious error of our author, is his assumption that revolutions or great social changes are the result of a misery too great to be borne. The history of all such changes shows, on the contrary, that they take place where the position of the oppressed classes is improving: when the provision for immediate needs does not occupy the whole of life, and hope has replaced despair.

S. H. SWINNY.

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By R. M. Maciver. London: Methuen & Co., 1921; pp. 166.

This small book by the author of *Community* may be safely recommended as a suitable introduction to the study of society. It avoids the danger, that frequently besets outlines of this subject, of creating the impression that sociology is nothing more than a more or less inadequate summary of the results of the particular social sciences, and it gives a very clear idea of what is to be understood by social law and by a synthetic study of society as a living entity or whole. Brief but lucid accounts are given of the nature and structure of society, of the phases of social evolution and of society in relation to environment. One of the merits of this book, as well as of *Community*, is that it brings out clearly the dangers of conceiving society either as an organism, or as a mind or soul. The unity that belongs to society, or rather

to community, is of a unique kind, and nothing but confusion can result from applying to it conceptions that may be appropriate enough in other sciences. It is a unity of enormous complexity and intricacy and arises out of interests complementary and conflicting, rational and irrational. At any rate, it obeys laws of its own and must be studied independently. As in his larger work, Professor Maciver clearly distinguishes between community, associations and institutions; and perhaps his most important contribution is to be found in his analysis and classification of the various social interests and the respective associations which develop out of them to form the complete structure of community.

His attitude to the State is, I think, brought out more clearly in this book than in *Community*. The state is one association among others, though it may be *prima inter pares*. There is nothing unique about it, and it does not exhaust all the interests of life. It certainly has no claim to absolute obedience; for, firstly, there are many other interests in life, embodied in other associations; secondly, behind all associational structure stands the community, with its infinitely subtle and delicate web of relationships, which escape and are not susceptible of organization; and, thirdly, because the individual is a unique focus of relationships, an end in himself, and therefore a final arbiter in cases of conflicting obligations. The state cannot for these reasons be absolute in any strict sense. Professor Maciver, however, rejects the doctrine of plural sovereignty, and, though in the main he sympathizes with the functional theory of sovereignty, taught by the Guild Socialists, notably, by Mr. G. D. H. Cole, he differs from them in claiming for the state the special functions of co-ordination, while Mr. Cole would say that co-ordination cannot lie in the hands of the state, which is but one association among others, but in a Joint Congress of all functional associations.

The attack against the state is largely directed against the idealist position, particularly as worked out by Professor Bosanquet. Similar attacks have frequently been made of late; but I am not sure that the position of the idealists has always been represented with sufficient detachment. It ought to be remembered that the resolution of the antithesis between the personal and the social upon which Professor Maciver lays so much stress and which forms the basis of his great law of social evolution, is after all largely the contribution of the idealist thinkers, though no doubt some of them have carried it too far in the direction of the absorption of the individual in society. So again, with regard to the absolutism of the state, it ought in fairness to be pointed out that Professor Bosanquet does not hold that the state is the whole end of life, or that it is the only object of loyalty, but merely that it has final authority in some things, i.e., that it has the function of dictating final adjustments in matters of external action. It may be doubted whether this view is really so very different from Professor Maciver's position that the special function of the state is that of co-ordination and adjustment of claims.

The book is written in a very attractive manner, and is well calculated to arouse and sustain the interest of both the general reader and the student of sociology. There are very useful notes for further reading.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

University College, London.

MAN AND THE ANIMAL WORLD.*

The inter-relations of man with the fauna of each country he inhabits are constantly considered by the anthropologist: so even the sociologist, with his perspective ranging from present towards past and future, must not allow himself to become too urban and academic to bear these in mind. Least of all now, when such a book has become

* James Ritchie, D.Sc., etc., "The Influence of Man on Animal Life in Scotland: A Study in Faunal Evolution." Cambridge, University Press, 1920.

available, a work learned and scholarly, encyclopaedic, indeed monographic, yet readable in every page, and on many even fascinating. For it brings together what has evidently been a lifelong accumulation of knowledge; and works this up, into a fuller, clearer and more interesting presentment than perhaps ever before, or in any country, the manifest action of man upon living nature; and to no small extent also, the reaction of nature on man. Here in fact is not only an interesting and representative region and fauna, interpreted with all the resources of great museums and libraries, yet fully in the field; nor even what we cannot but recognize as the very flowering of that Aberdeen school of biology in which Prof. J. Arthur Thomson, with his "web of life," so well continues the fine initiative of McGillivray; for here is the very spirit of Darwin himself, who would assuredly have rejoiced over this book beyond all ordinary readers, and then distributed, section by section, into his own accumulations, as his way was with what best helped him.

This is high praise: in fact the highest that can be offered; and it is regretted that limits of space prevent justifying this by citations, and even preclude adequate outline here. Naturalists and sportsmen, foresters, shepherds, farmers and breeders, will doubtless first of all rejoice in it; the zoologist will pass it on to the botanist and even to the geologist; but the general biologist, and the anthropologist, will recognize its full significance, and press this on the archaeologist, as he on the historian. The economist, as he begins to tire of abstract discussion, and turn towards a neophysocratic interest in regional development, will find this book suggestive; and, perhaps most of all, the sociologist as he similarly awakes to the concrete world he has to survey and interpret. For here, with copious detail and illustration, yet broad and lucid mastery, there is set, upon this definite and well-chosen stage of the north-western corner of Europe, the many-scened drama of man and nature; the story, as it were, of Adam and the creatures, dispersed into the wild, yet with varied returnings towards the garden. For first we see the region as man found it, with its fauna in their setting and as they lived. Then come man's direct interferences with animal life, in domestication or in destruction, and the various ways and outcomes of these—as in protection of animal life, for sport or utility, for beauty, or through popular favour or superstition, or again through the deliberate introduction of new animals for like reasons. Man's indirect interference with animal life next affords a new series of chapters, beginning with that destruction of forests which has been so fateful throughout history, more or less for all Europe and beyond. Next are analyzed out the manifold influences of cultivation and civilization, in the increase or decrease of animal life, and in its dispersal and change. The manifold forms introduced unawares, by commerce, etc., are each exhibited, and their influences, like each of the previous changes are estimated, for worse or better, on man's way and weal. The conclusion too is masterly, and of more than geographic and biological summary. Yet since the thoughtful reader will have here his one regret, that the sociological conclusions, though excellent as far as they go, are too brief, too compressed, the hope and suggestion arise that in the next edition these may be expanded and developed into at least one full-sized chapter. Still the praise with which this too short review opens substantially remains unabated; it even needs emphatic repetition; for the present writer at least can neither recall nor hear of any better presentment of natural history from the human standpoint, nor, indeed of any one quite as good, since Buffon laid down his pen.

P.G.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY FOR SOCIAL WORKERS AND GENERAL READERS.
By J. J. Findlay. Manchester University Press and Longmans, Green and Co., 1920.
6/- net.

The publication of this book, and of Maciver's "Elements of Social Science"

(reviewed on another page), is an encouraging event. It shows that Sociology is becoming established on at least the same footing as Psychology and Anthropology, and that a demand for books of the simpler text-book style begins to exist. We may hope that in a few years the presence of Sociology in the hierarchy of the Sciences will be taken for granted.

Of the book itself much that is favourable can be said. It is plainly the result of wide reading and constant thought, and the unpedantic way in which these are put to use adds greatly to its value. Reference to the problems of the war and the after-war period is frequently made, and serves to give an immediate interest to the discussion; there is throughout a recognition of the life of the present as the most important subject-matter of the sociologist. Technical terms are avoided, and there is everywhere an attempt to be readable and understandable by the less studious reader. No one can fail to carry away many illuminating suggestions from a perusal of the book.

Having read and enjoyed it, and having spoken thus in its praise, I come in turn to note what seem to me its two outstanding defects. The first is indicated by its division of subject-matter under three heads—Principles, Types of Social Grouping, and Organisation. At once one asks where consideration of social processes comes in; and finds on examination that they are dealt with incidentally, but nowhere is there any clear statement of their nature, or of the course which they have run historically. Further, there is no clear presentation of the relation between social grouping, social organisation, and social processes: all these are obviously aspects of the same thing, and the understanding of their relations is a fundamental thing in Sociology.

Second, and more vital, is the author's view of starting point and method in Sociology. He speaks throughout of society as based on the mental or spiritual relations between people; he seems to see or value nothing but the psychic bond in social life. To carry out this view to the limit would be to reduce Sociology to Social Psychology: a separate science would hardly be required. For my own part, I cannot see that Sociology begins until it is recognized that Society, like the individual, has an outer and an inner, life, and that the study of the two, in relation to one another, alone can promise scientific results. A failure to recognize this, in an elementary text-book on the subject, cannot but do harm to the progress of the science. Professor Findlay must forgive me, if, on that account, I call the failure in this book, a vital defect.

ALEXANDER FARQUHARSON.

REVOLUTION, 1789—1906. Edited by R. W. Postgate. Grant Richards. 18/- net.

This selection of documents is a most competent and interesting performance. Mr. Postgate has gone into the highways and bye-ways of the disinherited, and the results of his researches is in a high degree suggestive. Not, indeed, that it is likely to lead to eulogies of revolution. On the whole, the utterances Mr. Postgate collects represents the turgid rhetoric of men with a just grievance rather than the considered schemes of sober thinkers. Revolution presents itself in the garb of mysterious and eloquent conspiracy, not of sustained and provocative reconstruction. Mr. Postgate's plan has been to illustrate revolution at large and chronologically. That, in a sense, is to be regretted; for one tends to lose the continuity of thought which has run through all proletarian movements since 1789. To each group of documents Mr. Postgate has prefixed an introduction. These are, on the whole, admirably done where English and French movements are concerned; on the German and Italian side Mr. Postgate's linguistic equipment has not surmounted the obstacle of direct access to

the sources. The bibliographies are excellent; though it must have been the enthusiasm of friendship rather than the scholar's valuation which made Mr. Postgate write of Mr. Belloc's little book as the "best short history of the French Revolution."

H.J.L.

MAN AND HIS PAST. By O. G. S. Crawford. Oxford University Press, 1921; pp. 227; map.

Some sociologists express surprise that others of their kind devote so much of their time to the study of the remote past, and wonder what connection there can be between the life of early man and the problems which beset his present-day successors. Yet it remains a fact that not a few sociologists are deeply interested in the beginnings of civilization, while most true prehistoric archaeologists are keenly alive to the evils of the present day and contribute suggestions towards their amelioration. The misunderstanding between these two schools of thought arises, perhaps, from a misapprehension of the aims of the archaeologist, and from a confusion between his standpoint and that of the antiquary.

Mr. Crawford's book, which is in reality a series of essays connected together by a slender thread, should do much to make the position clear, for his first few chapters are mainly concerned with the aim and scope of archaeology and the relations it bears to history and anthropology. He discusses these problems at considerable length and with much vigour, and he shows how the archaeologist is aiming at constructing a full and continuous survey of man's advance from his simian ancestor to the present day. That his work is but continuing the story as told by the historian back into the remote past, though his tale differs from that of his colleague in paying attention less to the acts of individual men than to the life of the people as a whole, while he is more concerned with social and economic conditions than with political activities. He shows, in fact, that the archaeologist is less concerned with the remains of antiquity as things in themselves than as evidences of human progress, that the work of the archaeologist, as distinguished from that of the antiquary, is dynamic rather than static.

The first chapter of this work is mainly biological in its scope, and the author discusses tools as extra-corporeal limbs, and the influence of such rapidly made and readily changed external organs in hastening the intellectual development of man. His zoological arguments would, perhaps, not always meet with the approval of the modern biologist, but it is doubtful whether any of his inaccuracies in this direction seriously impair the value of his arguments. He has evidently written this chapter under the influence of the works of Samuel Butler, and he quotes to good purpose extracts from a paper by Elliott Smith; while some of his arguments do not quite carry conviction, the general conclusions at which he has arrived seem eminently sound. He touches on the question of the advances made as the result of the mingling of cultures, but this factor, all important in the progress of human civilization, has not been elaborated as fully as it deserves.

Then follow chapters on "The History of Man," "What is Archaeology," "Archaeology and History," and "Archaeology and anthropology," in which the author discusses the meaning of archaeology and its relations to other sciences. He recognizes at one place the wide scope of anthropology, and quotes with approval Dr. Marrett's definition of its aims, but elsewhere he treats of it as a science devoted mainly to the study of the backward peoples of the present day. Thus he distinguishes between a greater and a lesser anthropology, and is inclined to allot the name to the narrower point of view, and suggests that a new name is required for the more comprehensive science. The name he proposes is 'andrology,' a term obviously

objectionable, and it does not seem to have occurred to him that it would be more logical to retain the name anthropology for the whole and to devise a fresh term for the 'savage' part.

Mr. Crawford has much to say on history and history teaching, in fact, on all aspects of education, and his criticisms are not couched in tender terms. Though writing before the appearance of Mr. Wells' "Outline," he is a strong advocate of the study of world history, and believes that this should form an important element in the education of everyone. His arguments on this point are interesting, and he believes that such studies, more than any others, will prepare the way for the frame of mind which must precede a world peace.

His later chapters are concerned more with advice to would-be archaeologists on methods and profitable lines of inquiry. Too much space, perhaps, has been devoted to the tracing of Roman roads, but as this has been a favourite hobby of the author's he is rather inclined to over-rate its importance. The reason for these chapters appears to be that, whereas the study of archaeology is an essential part of the study of world history, and as the best method of study is to engage in research, it is important that such researches should become more general.

A final chapter on Museums contains many suggestive hints, though the author is somewhat too severe on existing institutions. It is true that many deserve and more than deserve his condemnation, but there has been great improvement in recent years, and still further improvements only await time and money. His sketch of an ideal museum, though impossible of attainment, will be valuable to those contemplating a thorough re-organisation of the institutions under their charge, and will perhaps lead others to see the need of rearrangement. Even though the ideal cannot be attained, it can be approximated, and any changes in the direction outlined will be valuable.

The work is somewhat disconnected, but it contains views and ideas which, though not altogether new, were in need of re-statement. It contains, too, much that is controversial but at the same time stimulating, and it will help to clear the minds of many as to the true functions of the study of man.

H.J.E.P.

PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. By E. S. Hartland. Methuen, 1921.

Mr. Sidney Hartland is well known as an indefatigable worker in the field of anthropology, with a long list of books to his name. The present volume adds yet another to that list, and we hope that he will live to complete others.

Primitive society is somewhat of a misnomer as a title. For Mr. Hartland does not attempt to give us a picture of the earliest forms of human society on this earth. "The earliest condition of human society is naturally unknown. If man were evolved from an ape or ape-like creature the operation must have been exceedingly slow. It is difficult to assign a limit, and to say at what point the species must be regarded as human, and ceased to belong to what we must look upon as the lower animals. Moreover, man must have evolved from a gregarious creature, and not from one of the 'higher' apes—all of them solitary, or found only in pairs with their immature offspring. Comparatively numerous hordes would alone have furnished that co-operation which would be necessary to evolution. Human beings are always found in societies. Even in the lowest savagery where they wander about in search of nutrition, they are, though in small parties, always within reach of their fellows, with whom from time to time they foregather for the purpose of religious rites, social intercourse, amusement, consultation, or joint action. Primeval societies of this kind, even if worthy to be qualified as human, must have retained many a trace of habits contracted in a lower state. Among these habits something like sexual promiscuity may probably be reckoned, relieved perhaps by temporary unions in the nature of monogamy" (11).

This book is really a collection of evidence for the former widespread existence on this earth of the institution of mother-right. The most characteristic feature of mother-right is the fact that descent is traced through women, and not through men, as in our own country. Mr. Hartland brings forward evidence to show that in many places where father-right is only known, the people formerly possessed the institution of mother-right. In this he is only retracing the ground already mapped out by others. The case that Mr. Hartland supports is now widely accepted and hardly needs arguing afresh.

It is a pity that Mr. Hartland has not attempted to study the question still deeper. How would he account for the fact, emphasized by Dr. Rivers in his article on Mother-right in the Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, that, in the United States, the communities with mother-right are those with the most advanced civilization? How would he explain the fact that, in that region, the peoples lower than them in civilization are patrilineal in their institutions? Why, again, were all the great nations of antiquity originally matrilineal, while so many peoples of low culture were patrilineal? Many difficult questions connected with the institution of mother-right need examination, and these are ignored. We still await the correlation of mother-right as an institution with the cult of the Great Mother, recently so strongly emphasized by Prof. Elliot Smith in his work on The Evolution of the Dragon as the first form of religion, with the Great Mother as the first deity. When that correlation is made it will, I feel certain, be found that the matriarchate is closely bound up with the cult of the Great Mother and with agriculture.

W. J. PERRY.

THE MAKING OF FRANCE.

FRENCH CIVILISATION FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.
By Albert Leon Guérard. London : T. Fisher Unwin, 21s. net.

This interesting and indeed fascinating study is one in which the fulfilment exceeds the promise. The author tells us that his endeavour is "to insist upon the complexity of human life and the overwhelming predominance of the unexplained"; but far from the book being a mere narrative, it is full of apposite explanations; and but for these there could be no reason for its existence. Especially good is the treatment of French nationality as historical unity triumphing over natural diversity. French civilization is a reality, even though France is only a geographical expression and the French a social hotch-potch. "An idea is a force." Though French tradition may be only a share of the common hoard of Europe, there is a French civilization, even though it is only Western civilization "refracted through a French milieu." The author finds no difficulty in reconciling patriotism and internationalism. Quoting Clemenceau's words, "France, of old, the soldier of God, then the soldier of Humanity, and ever the soldier of the Ideal," M. Guérard believes that "the truest Frenchman is he who follows most fearlessly the pioneering tradition of his race, and proclaims himself a citizen of the world."

Our author divides the nine hundred years between the fall of Rome and the Renaissance into two parts, the first five centuries being the "Dark Ages,"—the times of ignorance,—and the succeeding four centuries, the Middle Ages proper. This does not seem to me a satisfactory division. The very term "Middle Ages" implies the transition between ancient and modern times; and the so-called "Dark Ages," however unenlightened from the intellectual point of view, were occupied with strenuous labours from which all subsequent generations have drawn advantage. M. Guérard, indeed, emphasizes the sterility that had come to Roman Civilization, which fell more through its inner decay than by the efforts of the barbarians. The nine centuries from 400 to 1300 A.D. really fall into three divisions, roughly of three centuries each, the first being occupied with the civilizing of the barbarians and their amalgamation

with the remains of the Roman world. The second with the spread of Feudalism, as the main form of temporal government. The third, as the glorious period of fruition, the achievement and consummation of the past struggles. This mediaeval civilization our author rightly considers as ending in the early years of the fourteenth century, marked by the failure of Pope Boniface VIII, the Babylonian captivity of Avignon, the denunciation of serfdom by Louis VII, and many other signs. The next two centuries were a period of transition blind to its destiny. As our author well puts it : " Unfortunately, mediaeval civilization was not aware of its own demise ; it lingered on, an uneasy ghost, for nearly two hundred years."

The main subject of the book, however, is first the constitution of the French people ; and, secondly, the growth of French unity under the influence of the monarchy. As regards the former, the author has little difficulty in showing the extreme complexity of the racial origins, and he explodes the theory, once common, that the old French nobility were in the mass of Frankish origin. Between those who would make French civilization purely Celto-Latin, or chiefly Teutonic, he keeps an even keel. While considering it predominantly Latin, he gives due weight to other influences. As regards French unity, he in the main follows the line of that remarkable essay of Comte, written when he was only twenty-two, under the title of "A brief estimate of Modern History" (issued in an English translation as the second of the volume of his "Early Essays on Social Philosophy"); but M. Guérard, while following the main lines fills in many details and introduces some cautions possible in a more detailed examination. Generally in the dispute between King and nobles, the burghers supported the weaker part. In England, the King was strong, the nobles sought and gained the support of the citizens, and constitutional monarchy was the result. In France, the King was weak, the peaceable inhabitants wished above everything to obtain freedom from aristocratic violence, and so the monarchy that began with the King's small domain eventually grew into the all-powerful sovereignty of Louis XIV. It is a fascinating story that tells of the slow steps by which the House of Capet, at first weaker than some of its own vassals, gradually extended the small and broken domain between Paris and Orleans till province by province, indeed at first almost castle by castle, it eventually engulfed almost all that we now know as France; and the process went on even under the worst or weakest Kings. It was aided by the alliance of crown and church, and later by those changes in the art of war, which robbed the nobles of their prerogative, as essentially the defenders of the country against invaders. But the chief strength of the royal power, as well as the great check on its abuses, was the rise of an official class, legists and administrators, whose relation to the King was in no way feudal. "In serving him they were conscious of serving the state. . . . The traditional government of France is not autocracy, nor aristocracy, still less theocracy, and least of all democracy : it is middle class bureaucracy." But it must not be forgotten that in France bureaucracy is tempered by two conditions : first, France is a peasant country, and the passive resistance of the peasant is the bureaucrat's insurmountable barrier ; secondly, the diffusion of French culture among all classes and the very completeness of the bureaucratic monarchy's triumph has produced a general feeling of equality, which, if it makes the work of the official easier, forces him also to act justly between the various elements of the nation.

Most modern writers have been struck by the simplicity and unity of mediaeval civilization, as compared with the complexity of our own era. M. Guérard, on the contrary, thinks this an illusion due to remoteness. He points to the varied origins, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Barbarian. He notes that even in Christianity there were many different strains, derived from the oriental religion of the Hebrews with their tribal God, a subtle dialectic inherited from the Greeks of Alexandria, a Church

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Our author divides the nine hundred years between the fall of Rome and the Renaissance into two parts, the first five centuries being the "Dark Ages,"—the times of ignorance,—and the succeeding four centuries, the Middle Ages proper. This does not seem to me a satisfactory division. The very term "Middle Ages" implies the transition between ancient and modern times; and the so-called "Dark Ages," however unenlightened from the intellectual point of view, were occupied with strenuous labours from which all subsequent generations have drawn advantage. M. Guérard, indeed, emphasizes the sterility that had come to Roman Civilization, which fell more through its inner decay than by the efforts of the barbarians. The nine centuries from 400 to 1300 A.D. really fall into three divisions, roughly of three centuries each, the first being occupied with the civilizing of the barbarians and their amalgamation

with the remains of the Roman world. The second with the spread of Feudalism, as the main form of temporal government. The third, as the glorious period of fruition, the achievement and consummation of the past struggles. This mediaeval civilization our author rightly considers as ending in the early years of the fourteenth century, marked by the failure of Pope Boniface VIII, the Babylonian captivity of Avignon, the denunciation of serfdom by Louis VII, and many other signs. The next two centuries were a period of transition blind to its destiny. As our author well puts it : " Unfortunately, mediaeval civilization was not aware of its own demise ; it lingered on, an uneasy ghost, for nearly two hundred years."

The main subject of the book, however, is first the constitution of the French people ; and, secondly, the growth of French unity under the influence of the monarchy. As regards the former, the author has little difficulty in showing the extreme complexity of the racial origins, and he explodes the theory, once common, that the old French nobility were in the mass of Frankish origin. Between those who would make French civilization purely Celto-Latin, or chiefly Teutonic, he keeps an even keel. While considering it predominantly Latin, he gives due weight to other influences. As regards French unity, he in the main follows the line of that remarkable essay of Comte, written when he was only twenty-two, under the title of "A brief estimate of Modern History" (issued in an English translation as the second of the volume of his "Early Essays on Social Philosophy"); but M. Guérard, while following the main lines fills in many details and introduces some cautions possible in a more detailed examination. Generally in the dispute between King and nobles, the burghers supported the weaker part. In England, the King was strong, the nobles sought and gained the support of the citizens, and constitutional monarchy was the result. In France, the King was weak, the peaceable inhabitants wished above everything to obtain freedom from aristocratic violence, and so the monarchy that began with the King's small domain eventually grew into the all-powerful sovereignty of Louis XIV. It is a fascinating story that tells of the slow steps by which the House of Capet, at first weaker than some of its own vassals, gradually extended the small and broken domain between Paris and Orleans till province by province, indeed at first almost castle by castle, it eventually engulfed almost all that we now know as France ; and the process went on even under the worst or weakest Kings. It was aided by the alliance of crown and church, and later by those changes in the art of war, which robbed the nobles of their prerogative, as essentially the defenders of the country against invaders. But the chief strength of the royal power, as well as the great check on its abuses, was the rise of an official class, legists and administrators, whose relation to the King was in no way feudal. "In serving him they were conscious of serving the state. . . . The traditional government of France is not autocracy, nor aristocracy, still less theocracy, and least of all democracy : it is middle class bureaucracy." But it must not be forgotten that in France bureaucracy is tempered by two conditions : first, France is a peasant country, and the passive resistance of the peasant is the bureaucrat's insurmountable barrier ; secondly, the diffusion of French culture among all classes and the very completeness of the bureaucratic monarchy's triumph has produced a general feeling of equality, which, if it makes the work of the official easier, forces him also to act justly between the various elements of the nation.

Most modern writers have been struck by the simplicity and unity of mediaeval civilization, as compared with the complexity of our own era. M. Guérard, on the contrary, thinks this an illusion due to remoteness. He points to the varied origins, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Barbarian. He notes that even in Christianity there were many different strains, derived from the oriental religion of the Hebrews with their tribal God, a subtle dialectic inherited from the Greeks of Alexandria, a Church

organization reminiscent of Pagan, and Imperial Rome, and among the masses, Fetishism and Polytheism unabashed. Yet even in the conception of unity, and the struggle to attain it, there was a simplification of life and its aims which has since been lacking. This is to some extent acknowledged by the author. In his penultimate paragraph he writes :—

" The Renaissance only half emancipated the secular mind ; it fostered reason and science, whilst still rendering lip-service to theology. Because we have served two masters, our faith has lost in substance and our civilization in spiritual light. We shall have to return to the mediæval idea that priest and scientist should be one and the same. We may reinterpret the very concept of Revelation, widen it so as to include the sum total of man's achievements, and make it once more the corner-stone of our culture. A new Auguste Comte may yet be our Thomas Aquinas."

But neither a new nor the old Auguste Comte can ever be a Thomas Aquinas, for a scientific philosophy is necessarily relative and organic, dealing with development ; its synthesis must be ever growing, a living whole. I am almost inclined to suspect that M. Guérard himself is trying to serve two masters, and thereby missing that unity he is so well fitted to achieve.

S. H. SWINNY.

THE THREEFOLD STATE. By Rudolph Steiner. London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920 pp. xix, 201.

There is a great deal in this book of Dr. Steiner's which will be read with sympathy by radical-minded people in this country ; as, e.g., his insistence on the importance of radical changes in the social structure, if the world is to be saved from chaos : his reiterated protests against the so-called " practical " men, who dismiss all proposals for such radical changes as " Utopian," merely because for them the practical is synonymous with the familiar : and the stress he lays on the importance of a psychological study of the labour movement. His own analysis of the labour movement in Germany is interesting. He argues that movement rests completely on a purely intellectual or scientific basis. The upper classes, though they have a greater knowledge of science, are not greatly influenced by purely scientific conceptions in their actual lives while they retain a great deal of the older and vaguer spiritual and cultural elements. The working classes, on the other hand, owing to the conditions of modern life, are in fact greatly influenced by scientific economics, whether in the shape of Marxian or other theories, while the spiritual side of life is dismissed as mere " ideology." Whether Dr. Steiner's view that " the most powerful driving force in the world of labour is a system of thought " (p. 29), be true of Germany or not, I doubt if it can be at all safely asserted of the British Labour Movement. In so far as the latter is guided by ideas at all, it would be truer to say that it has been inspired by a vague humanitarianism or belief in progress. The problem thus raised is a very interesting one. Nothing is more common in recent literature than the assertion that ideas and theories have no dynamic energy, but are merely pale reflections of unconscious factors, but no really scientific study of the problem has been made so far as I know. A study of the Labour movement in England from this point of view would be very valuable.

The solution that Dr. Steiner has to offer of the social problem is connected by him with the well-worn analogy of the individual organism. Just as in the latter there are three relatively independent systems, " the head, the circulatory and the digestive systems," and there is not absolute centralization, so in the social life, there ought to be the economic system which is to deal with the production, circulation and consumption of commodities ; secondly, the political system which is to deal with

relations of right that arise between persons; and thirdly, a system that comprises "all that concerns the life of the mind and spirit." Dr. Steiner, it is interesting to note, has no sympathy at all with State-Socialism, or the socialization of industry, and insists strenuously that all industrial and economic business must be eliminated from the state. He seems to think that the sphere of economics can be separated from the sphere of rights as such which is the function of the Equity-State (not a very happy translation of *Rechtsstaat*) to secure. But this is not worked out very clearly. Rights are claims to the conditions necessary for the free development of the social personality. Hence whenever there are persons and conditions requisite for their development, there are rights. How such rights are to be secured is a question that can only be decided by experience. So, too, the precise functions of the political state in relation to rights can only be determined when we know what the state, with its mechanical methods can accomplish, without defeating the real end of social organization which is to secure the good life. It might be argued from this point of view that the state ought not to interfere in economic matters; but this would not be to say that the sphere of rights can be separated from the sphere of economics.

The independence of the economic system does not mean as might be at first expected, control by the workers. Apparently according to Dr. Steiner, private property in capital is to remain; but the Equity-State is to see to it that the capital is rightly used, i.e., that it is in the hands of persons of ability who use it in the public service, and in the case of abuse, it must transfer the capital to other individuals or groups. The terms of the transfer are to be regulated by the Equity-State.

This position surely presents great difficulties. In the first place, it would necessitate an enormous machinery for the inspection and supervision of industry which could hardly be reconciled with the alleged independence of the two systems: and, in the second place, it ignores the fact that the political state tends and would still tend, under Dr. Steiner's system, to be dominated and controlled by powerful economic interests and that the transfer of property in accordance with right would be therefore very difficult to ensure.

As regards the spiritual agencies, Dr. Steiner has a good deal to say that is of interest; yet one cannot but feel that in this book, at any rate, he often uses the words "spirit" and "spiritual" in that vague way against which he himself protests in the Foreword.

There is a discussion of international relations which throws a good deal of light upon pre-war German mentality.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LEGISLATION. By J. W. Hetherington. Methuen, 1920.

The title of this book is perhaps a little misleading, the work being not a general treatise but consisting mainly of the story of the Washington Conference 1919, with some introductory explanations and comments by the author. Within these limits the book is extremely interesting, and shows that Mr. Hetherington undertook the work in a spirit of genuine enthusiasm tempered by a clear vision of the difficulties as well as of the possibilities of the organisation he helped to bring into existence.

International Conferences on Industrial Legislation have been held on various occasions, and Conventions have been agreed to by the Powers concerned. The International Association for Labour Legislation, a voluntary body which has been in existence about 20 years, did much useful work in exploring the field within which international industrial law could effectively function, and through the instrumentality of this body and of its component national sections a large amount of research was conducted, the results being published in a periodical bulletin and in pamphlets and reports issued to the Conferences, which were held in alternate years previous to the

outbreak of war. Thus the Association played the part of a "gadfly" in stimulating the conscience of industrial states and in 1905 the Swiss Government was induced to invite a conference of technical experts appointed by their respective governments, which met at Berne in the following year and agreed on Conventions prohibiting the use of white phosphorus in matches and the industrial employment of women during the night. A later Conference, constituted on similar lines, was planned, but was rendered abortive through the War.

The new departure of 1919 was the setting up, through the instrumentality of the Peace Conference and in pursuance of the terms of the Peace Treaty, of a permanent organisation for International Labour Legislation. The regulation of working conditions was thus recognized to be among the matters of more than national interest.

The argument for international control of labour conditions is on the face of it quite simple. "Within certain limits, higher standards of living reflect themselves in higher costs of manufacture," and the dread of foreign competition is a constant drag on the progressive development of factory legislation. Hence the need that industrial law in the several countries should be buttressed by international agreement. The difficulties are obvious but are often exaggerated. "Most states have a great deal of common experience; they find the same kind of difficulties or definite evils arising out of similar conditions. There is perhaps less disagreement among nations than among interests within nations as to the main features of a desirable industrial organisation."

One difficulty may emerge on the side of the workers. The minimal standards prescribed by an international assembly will probably tend to be less satisfactory than those which have been secured by the independent action of the workers of the more progressive countries, and thus the progress of labour legislation may be held back in those more advanced states. But this risk is far less than the danger of unregulated competition, and probably will be willingly taken by organized labour for the sake of their international ideals.

In spite of difficulties of procedure, in spite of the immense hindrances that impede the smooth working of a polyglot assembly, divided by traditions, sentiment and outlook as well as by language, it is evident that the Conference succeeded in touching the creative impulse in those who took part. This is what is needed. It is perhaps one of the hardest and most cruel lessons of the Great War that loyalty and obedience to old traditions will not suffice to save society. We must look forward, we must create new forms where the old have become obsolete. Mr. Hetherington writes modestly of the particular organisation he himself helped to shape, and says: "It quite certainly can *as yet* do little to alter profoundly the economic and industrial future of the world" (italics added). But he points out that, "at the least the Labour Organisation, touching as it does the affairs of men on issues which . . . carry the seeds of conflict, can effect many things in the way of a 'removal of hindrances' . . . and 'The power of an ideal to draw to itself the regard and devotion of men is immeasurably enhanced when it is 'made flesh and dwells among us.''" That is the spirit which can breathe life into the prosaic detail and technical discussion that make up so much of an International Conference. It is a different form of heroism from that which led millions of the world's youth into the trenches in 1914, but it is a form the world now needs even more desperately.

Mr. Hetherington calls attention to the very special measure of responsibility resting upon the British Government (p. 105). The British delegation took a considerable part in shaping Conference policy, and there can be little doubt that the immediate future of international institutions depends primarily on the loyalty of Great Britain and the British Dominions. If our country fails to adhere faithfully to the

decisions of an international assembly in which our representatives took a leading part, the effect will be a set-back to international co-operation and incidentally the continued persistence of "the false tradition of British cynicism and hypocrisy" (p. 106). We imagine that the writer of those words must have felt a poignant regret over the subsequent attempts of the British Government to evade its plain duty of offering the Washington Conventions to Parliament for discussion.

B.L.H.

THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE. By A. C. Pigou, M.A., Professor of Economics in the University of Cambridge. MacMillan and Co., Ltd.

Professor Pigou bears an honoured name in the academic world of economics. He is the successor of Professor Marshall in the chair of Political Economy at Cambridge, which that distinguished exponent of economics elevated during the last quarter of the nineteenth century into a position of undisputed and acknowledged supremacy as the English centre of economic research: a position now gradually being lost to that rising institution, the London School of Economics. Professor Pigou, too is a remarkably versatile master in his own science: he unites unusual skill in the mathematical and statistical exposition of economic phenomena, and wide grasp of all that is latest in the philosophical theory of the science. And as a controversialist, in the sphere of free-trade, socialism, taxation of land and capital values, he has won an honourable reputation for his combination of fairness and good sense, with keen dialectical skill. A reasoned treatise in Economics at his hand, therefore, is sure of a warm welcome in the academic forum.

The present work, although re-written and expanded, is not exactly an original treatise. In 1912 Professor Pigou published a fascinating and instructive series of essays on the problem of distribution under the title "Wealth and Welfare." He there developed far-reaching views on the measurement of welfare by means of many cunningly devised improvements in the standard systems of "Index Numbers," and polemised with destructive acumen against the conservative theory of distribution known as "Pareto's Law." That series of essays made it clear to most discerning critics that Professor Pigou's best services to Economics would probably lie in advancing the theory of Distribution. Other writings of the learned teacher have since confirmed that view. The present monumental work, which is essentially an expansion of "Wealth and Welfare," into a far-reaching and comprehensive treatise, nearly one thousand octavo pages in size, proves still more convincingly that here the author has found his *métier*. It is, in fact, the best discussion of the Theory of Distribution in existence, being at once larger and broader, as well as more detailed, than the well-known but slighter treatises of Professor Clark and Mr. J. A. Hobson. The book indeed does not cover the whole field of Distribution: little is said about rent or interest; the author's concern being essentially with wages and profits. Nor does it exclude some topics not usually included in the theory of Distribution, e.g., "Insurance" and "Rationing" in industry. But, in the main, the book does not concern itself with the Theories of Production, or Consumption, or Exchange, or Value.

Herein, perhaps, lies an inevitable weakness of the book, as regarded from the standpoint of Sociology. The great defect of the classical, and indeed all, systems of Economics, as we believe, is that they take a radically limited and therefore false view of industrial life. To the economist the problem always is:—

- (1) how to produce the maximum quantity of goods and services at the minimum cost;
- (2) how to distribute these goods so as to give each person the maximum attainable quantity without injuring the whole economic system; and

(3) how to distribute the cost of production, i.e., the pain and fatigue of work—so as to be as little burdensome as possible on any producer.

When this end has been attained, if ever it can be attained, the millenium of the economist will have been reached. Now Professor Pigou fully accepts this standpoint. He recognizes, indeed, for he is nothing if not broad-minded and profound, that a perfect distribution of this kind, might take place, and yet mankind be extremely unhappy. Indeed, in his first chapter he conscientiously points out a possible disharmony between material prosperity and spiritual excellence, between efficiency in the factory, and happiness in its workers, between utility and beauty. But he seems to think that these discrepancies are rather possible than actual, and so unlikely to happen that they can be neglected by the economist. Indeed, the prevailing interest in Einstein and the Theory of Relativity has evidently suggested to Professor Pigou an ingenious analogy between different systems of economics and the three possible systems of Non-Euclidean Geometry. But, while admitting that, theoretically, a different system of economics than the one constructed by orthodox economics *might* exist, he inclines to regard such probability as negligible, and accepts as the basis of his own views all the existing postulates of the science.

Here a modern sociologist, especially one who accepts either the general standpoint of Leplay, or that of Lester Ward, must find himself at variance with Professor Pigou. A sociologist cannot regard the objective of the industrial system as either the highest possible production of wealth at the lowest possible cost, or yet as the best possible distribution of the world's commodities amongst its population. To the sociologist, production and wealth exist only as an instrument towards welfare, not as the economic end. The real object of an industrial system is, *not* the production of goods, but the creation and upkeep of institutions in which a man can exercise his activities so as to realize best his highest self. Agriculture does not exist in order to provide mankind with food, but in order to enable men with a vocation for farming to enjoy that mode of life. So it is with mining, engineering, dressmaking, any other industry you please. A trade or craft is essentially an artistic mode of spending one's life, not a method of producing goods. It is an end in itself, not a means to another end, namely, the production of wealth. True, the production of goods is important, but it is secondary, not the primary object of the existence of the industry, as orthodox—and for that matter of it, unorthodox—systems of economics take for granted. A system of peasant proprietors, or of artisan manufacturers, or of motor-car distributors, for example, may represent a more advanced economic system than the system of large enterprizes, although it produces few commodities at higher cost, provided it satisfies better the longing towards full self-development implanted in each man. The Totemic system of early savages, the caste-system of India, the feudal system of the middle ages; these were all the final results of an effort to produce a state of society in which each man found the vocation for which he was best fitted. The Industrial Revolution created a new economic basis, in which this essential element of social well-being has been displaced, for a time, by the tendency of organization and machine and concentrated mechanical power to take control of the individual and make him a more wealth-producing instrument. But the Industrial Revolution, let us hope, is only a phase which marks an era of transition. In time the citizen will learn how to tame the machine, and restore the dominance of the vocational over the merely instrumental aspects of industry. With all its many faults and fallacies, the Soviet ideal is a crude attempt to get a move on in this direction. J. H. MENZIES.

THE I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism. By P. F. Brissenden, Ph.D. and edition, 1920.

This is a lengthy, detailed, and much documented study of American revolutionary

trade unionism. Dr. Brissenden traces back the origins of the I.W.W. to the revolutionary efforts of the 19th century, both in England and America, as for instance the New Unionism of Owen, the Chartists, the Knights of Labour, and others. In some ways, however, the book is meagre and unsatisfactory. We feel the need of some statement or appreciation of the economic developments that evoked these reactions. Chapter III, which is on the whole one of the best chapters, shows the revolt of industrial unionism against the old craft organisations, but fails to indicate the forces impelling this revolt. We have a vivid picture of the fluctuations, changes and internal divisions of the I.W.W., but nothing that even attempts to explain why an I.W.W. had to be, what, in the slang phrase, it was "up against." The omission does not apparently arise out of an absence of sympathy with the newer labour movement, for there is evidence that Dr. Brissenden, though critical, is on the whole sympathetic. In an amusingly ambiguous sentence he gives a glimpse of his own feelings: "Perhaps the very best way to run an industrial enterprise is on the currently accepted model of the Prussian State. It is simply a moot point, and the I.W.W. has challenged the Prussian method." The difficulty of fuller treatment appears to have been the mass of material collected, which is so great that, as the author himself owns in the preface, his plan of composition had to be altered and in part abandoned. Some attempt to sketch the rise and growth of the Trust movement, the special difficulties connected with foreign immigration, and so forth, is, however, badly needed. We hope Dr. Brissenden may feel inclined to follow up a work which, whatever its imperfections, is in many ways extremely valuable, with another in which he might place his subject in a clearer relation to the economic conditions of the time and place.

B.L.H.

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*I. ALLIED SHIPPING CONTROL. An Experiment in International Administration. J. A. Salter. pp. 372; 14 statistical tables and 2 diagrams. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921. 10/6d. net.

*II. WAR GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS. A. B. Keith. pp. 353. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921. 10/6d. net.

*III. PRICES AND WAGES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1914-1920. A. L. Bowley. pp. 228; 3 appendices. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921. 10/6d. net.

*THEORY AND HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY. Benedetto Croce. Translated by Douglas Ainslie. Harrap, London, 1921. 15/- net.

*LA SOCIOLOGIE SA NATURE, SON CONTENU, SES ATTACHES. René Worms. pp. 164. Bibliotheque sociologique Internationale. Serie in-18 —J. Marcel Giard & Cie. Paris, 1921. 5 fr.

*A SHORT FISCAL AND FINANCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1815-1918). J. F. Rees. pp. 246. Methuen, London, 1921. 6/- net.

*PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. Robert H. Lowie. pp. 453. With Bibliography. Routledge, London, 1921. 21/- net.

*FROM A MODERN UNIVERSITY: Some Aims and Aspirations of Science. Arthur Smithells. pp. 124. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1921. 12/6d. net.

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***GOODS AND BADS.** Outlines of a philosophy of Life. Alban C. Widgery. The Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy. xvi. pp. 318. The College, Baroda, India. Rs. 5.

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA BULLETIN. Vol. xvi, May 1921, No. 3. pp. 335. Year Book for 1920-21.

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EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK. Jesse Frederick Steiner. pp. 91. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1921.

LAW AND BUSINESS. William H. Spencer. Vol. i. Introduction by L. C. Marshall. pp. 611. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1921. \$4.50.

INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT. John R. Commons, and other Members of the Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin. pp. 425. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921. 17/- net.

THOUGHTS ON WAR AND PEACE. An Inquiry into the Conceptions prevailing in Foreign Politics. Nicholas Petrescu. pp. 124. Watt, London, 1921. 5/- net.

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PERIODICALS RECEIVED.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW.	THE OPEN COURT.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.	POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY.	PROGRESS.
ARCHIV. FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK.	QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS.
ECONOMICA.	REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE.
THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL.	REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL TEACHER.	REVUE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE BRUXELLES.
HINDUSTANI REVIEW.	RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SOCIOLOGIA.
INDIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS.	SCIENTA.
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